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Abstract 
In order to successfully acquire reward under many different circumstances, a 
decision maker must learn to expect a particular outcome in a specific situation. The 
ability to predict an expected outcome simplifies the decision process and enables a 
decision maker to accurately choose between multiple options without having to 
experience each option independently. The orbitofrontal cortex represents specific 
outcomes and aids in the selection of actions to acquire specific outcomes without 
experiencing the direct action-outcome sequence. Without the orbitofrontal cortex, 
humans, non-human primates, and rats all exhibit an inability to modify their actions to 
changing reward conditions. In addition, an intact orbitofrontal cortex is required to 
correctly identify cues paired with and predictive of reward. Without the orbitofrontal 
cortex the ability to distinguish between differing expectations collapses.  
The ability to create counterfactuals, a representation of the alternative would-
have-been received outcome, is thought to aid in the process of simulating the expected 
outcomes of a situation. The representation of counterfactuals has been found in the 
orbitofrontal cortex in humans and non-human primates. While there is some evidence 
that rats can represent the counterfactual, the only direct neural evidence is presented in 
this thesis. Without the representation of a counterfactual, it is impossible to experience 
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regret. If the orbitofrontal cortex is homologous across species and if rats can represent 
the counterfactual, can rats represent the counterfactual during regret inducing situations? 
 Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis examine the homology of the orbitofrontal cortex 
comparing the structure of OFC in humans, rats and non-human primates. These chapters 
also summarize the current hypotheses regarding Orbitofrontal cortex function. 
Orbitofrontal cortex has been shown to be largely homologous among humans, non-
human primates and rats.  
The third chapter of this thesis introduces the concept of regret and 
counterfactuals and explains the etymology, psychology and economics that describe 
how regret and counterfactuals can be studied. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis shows that rats are capable of representing the 
counterfactual. One key aspect of orbitofrontal function is in the representation of 
counterfactuals and regret. Counterfactuals are defined as the alternative, would-have-
been option. Rats performing on a multiple T maze, stopped at a decision point and 
looked both directions before continuing to reward. During this pause, orbitofrontal 
neurons represented reward after ventral striatal neurons represented reward. The reward 
representation was general. Once rats arrived at the reward sites, orbitofrontal neurons 
reliably represented the reward and continued to do so for every reward encounter. 
However, when rats arrived at reward locations that were not active, orbitofrontal 
neurons represented the other reward site, representing the counterfactual.  
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Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis expand on the necessity of counterfactuals to 
decision making and shows that rats are capable of experiencing regret on an economic 
foraging task. Rats showed distinct economic preferences on a circular foraging task. 
Rats waited longer for flavors of reward that they preferred and spent less time waiting 
for rewards they did not prefer. Neural responses reliably differentiated between reward 
flavors and the zones associated with the reward flavors.  
When a rat left a preferred reward early, without receiving reward, then 
encountered a non-preferred reward with a longer wait, the rat’s behavior matched the 
economic definition of regret. Regret occurs when a decision maker selects between two 
options and the option finally received is less valuable than what the alternative option 
would have produced. Importantly this can be differentiated from disappointment, where 
an option received is less than expected even though it was not the fault of the decision 
maker. Counterfactuals are necessary for the experience of regret. Humans without an 
orbitofrontal cortex do not experience regret. However, regret has traditionally been 
known as a human experience. Economic definitions of regret make it possible to 
measure regret in rodents. During these regret instances neural ensembles in the 
orbitofrontal cortex represented the missed, previous action. These representations agree 
with psychological accounts of regret that state decision makers regret the action that led 
to outcome more than outcome.  
 vii 
 
In the final chapter, chapter 7, the role of orbitofrontal cortex is re-examined in 
the context of regret and counterfactuals. Specifically, the previously introduced 
hypotheses from Chapter 2 are reviewed under the framework introduced by 
counterfactuals and regret.  
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1. Neuroanatomy of the orbitofrontal cortex 
 
 
The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is located on the ventral medial surface of the 
forebrain and receives a large number of inputs. The OFC receives sensory information 
from many sources, such as the gustatory and olfactory cortices. Other inputs from 
structures such as the ventral striatum and prefrontal cortex support integration of sensory 
information, reward information and higher level, cognitive processes potentially 
providing the information  necessary to instruct future choices. The OFC has been 
implicated in a variety of decision making tasks and is essential in reversal tasks as well 
as in the recognition of regret. 
1.1 Basic connectivity of OFC 
The OFC receives a wide variety of inputs from many different regions 
throughout the brain, both as direct connections and as thalamic connections from the 
medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus
45,46,86,147-149,151-153,221,248
. The OFC has strong 
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reciprocal connections with the medial prefrontal cortex and the limbic system, two areas 
associated with decision making
160-162,252,295,297,360,361
.  
The internal connectivity of OFC reveals two separate connectivity patterns. 
There is little interconnectivity between the two relatively distinct networks within the 
OFC
221
. Even though previous results from humans and non-human primates are reported 
to be from different regions within OFC, the connectivity patterns between OFC and 
other areas of the cortex are largely consistent. The connectivity similarities between 
human and non-human primates has been supported by diffusion tensor imaging of the 
fiber tracts in human and non-human primate OFC
61
. In both humans and non-human 
primates prefrontal connectivity with subcortical regions was homologous. 
 The more medial aspects of OFC are reciprocally connected to the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex. Central and lateral OFC show a much weaker reciprocal connectivity 
with ventral medial prefrontal cortex and receive more visceral afferents
43,221
.  
In humans and non-human primates OFC receives and projects to the amygdalar 
complex (specifically the basal lateral nucleus of the amygdala), anterior hippocampus, 
hypothalamus, nucleus accumbens, and cingulate cortex
45,46,86,104,221
. Regions of the 
cortex that process somatosensory, olfactory and viscera inputs project strongly to the 
OFC
45,47,221,275
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1.2 Comparing OFC in rats with humans and non-human 
primates 
While human and non-human primate OFC are generally agreed to be 
homologous, there is still debate as to whether rat OFC is homologous. The neuronal 
profile of OFC in humans and non-human primates consists of pyramidal cells as well as 
small granule cell layers
44,181,248
.  However rat OFC consists entirely of large bodied 
pyramidal cells
248
. Rats lack any evidence of smaller cell body, granule layers in OFC
221
 
and until recently little evidence supported distinct differences in projection patterns from 
the different regions of OFC to other areas of the brain
183
. However neuroanatomical 
evidence now indicates that rat OFC may be homologous to non-human primate and 
human OFC. 
 If the orbitofrontal cortex is classified by thalamic projections
277
, the connectivity 
pattern of rat OFC is homologous to non-human primate and human
101
. By using 
thalamic inputs and outputs, the medial dorsal nucleus of the thalamus projects to the 
same orbitalfrontal areas in rats, non-human primates and humans
45,101,152,153,164
. Based on 
these projections and their relatively similarity across species, the orbital and agranular 
insular areas of rat orbitofrontal cortex can be considered to be homologous to non-
human primate and human OFC
101,164,221,246,306
. The OFC in the rat includes ventral 
orbital, lateral orbital and to some extent the agranular insular cortex. However OFC 
classification in the rat does not include the region along the medial wall of the ventral 
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forebrain which is likely equivalent to ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in 
humans and non-human primates
183,212,221,304
.  
Like humans and non-human primates, the OFC in rats receives inputs from and 
projects to the amygdalar complex (the majority of reciprocal connections terminate in 
the basal lateral amygdala), anterior hippocampus
250
, hypothalamus and nucleus 
accumbens
183,221
. In addition, the strong connectivity of OFC with the basal lateral 
amygdala in both non-human primates and rats is thought to contribute to the 
motivational and emotional constituents of learning
9,68,80,118,145,161,295
. Lesions to 
amygdala and OFC in both non-human primates and rats produce similar 
deficits
85,90,127,186,233,295,296,301,306,363
. In addition in both rats and non-human primates the 
OFC projects to the nucleus accumbens, overlapping with inputs from the 
amygdala
100,104,194,220,348
. Most primate neurophysiology has focused on the anterior, 
central OFC
225-228
 while most rat physiology has focused on the more posterior aspects of 
the orbitofrontal-medial/lateral cortex
142,184,296,298,299,327,328,356-358
. In contrast, most prior 
research in humans is reported from the ventral medial prefrontal cortex
107,130,137
. The 
discrepancy in recording locations, lesion boundaries and the experimental results in rats, 
non-human primates and humans raises a very important question: are all regions of OFC 
functionally equivalent? 
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Figure 1-1 Connectivity patterns of OFC in rats and non-human primates. 
OFC (blue), striatum (pink), amygdala (orange), medial dorsal thalamus (green).The connectivity patterns 
of medial dorsal thalamus and orbitofrontal cortex are largely consistent between rats and non-human 
primates. Inputs and outputs to and from OFC are conserved across species. (used with permission
303
) 
1.3 Homogeneity of the orbitofrontal cortex 
Other areas of prefrontal cortex are functionally distinct. Similarly, there may be 
functional distinctions in OFC regions. Anatomical evidence suggests that there are 
regional OFC differences in connectivity and function in non-human primates
45
, 
humans
137
 and finally in rats
152,153,247
. These regional distinctions may contribute to the 
different results reported in a variety of past experiments regarding OFC function in 
humans, non-human primates and rats.  
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A growing body of literature suggests that there is indeed a behavioral and 
neurophysiological distinction between the different regions of OFC in humans (ventral-
medial versus lateral)
144,196,234,329,373
, non-human primates (central versus 
lateral)
141,213,215,228,265,342
 and rats (ventral-lateral versus dorsal-
lateral)
81,142,283,296,298,299,327,328,356-358
. In human, the ventral medial OFC may be 
responsible for the representation of how valuable a reward is compared to other rewards 
(economic value)
21,74,97,108-110,130,131,214,229,241,349
. Lateral aspects of OFC may be involved 
in assigning reward to the actions required to receive reward (credit assignment)
196,214,282
. 
In non-human primates, there is little evidence to suggest the coding of economic value 
in the vmPFC, rather all current evidence suggests that economic value is being 
represented in central OFC
228
 and that the more lateral aspects of OFC process credit 
assignment 
365
. In rats, most of the neurophysiological and behavioral evidence comes 
from the ventral-lateral and dorsal-lateral OFC. 
 If the rat OFC is homologous to human and non-human primate OFC, then the 
ventral-lateral aspects of OFC in rats should play a role in credit assignment and exhibit 
reward related activity for any action or cue leading to reward. Several previous 
experiments have shown reward/cue related activity in ventral-lateral rat OFC as well 
distinct representations of credit assignment
91,142,184,296,298,299,308,327,328
. These experimental 
findings in rat ventral-medial OFC agree with experimental data from humans
99,349
 and 
non-human primate lateral OFC
213,215,279,280,364,365
. In addition, the specific coding of 
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economic value as seen in non-human primates
228
 may exist in the ventral medial aspects 
of rat OFC close to the ventral wall (medial orbital cortex and ventral pre limbic)  where 
little neurophysiological evidence has yet to be published. What little evidence that exists 
regarding the role of ventral-medial orbital cortex in rats indicates that the medial orbital 
cortex is indeed involved in the calculation of value. Previous studies have found that the 
medial orbitofrontal cortex of rats is involved in the probability of receiving reward
320
, 
selecting a learned behavior for a desired value
92
 and choosing between delayed options 
effectively weighing the value of the available options
185,202,283,324
. Although sparse, these 
findings are consistent with human
13,25,196
 and non-human primate data
117,215,261-263,265
.  
Other experiments in humans and non-human primates have shown that central 
OFC (in non-human primates)
1
 and aspects of medial and lateral OFC (in humans) 
41,56,57
 
are involved in the representation of hypothetical outcomes. Specifically, in humans the 
medial OFC represents missed past outcomes
56,57
 and imagined future outcomes
33
. In 
non-human primates single neurons in the central OFC increased their activity for the 
cued, hypothetical outcome
1
. If rat ventral-lateral OFC is equivalent to these regions in 
human and non-human primates, then it would be expected to see similar responses when 
encountering situations that induce the representation of hypothetical outcomes. Indeed 
initial evidence suggests that rat ventral-lateral OFC does contain representations of 
imagined outcomes
333
. These experiments as well as their consistent findings across 
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animal models support the functional segregation of orbitofrontal regions in rats as well 
as the homology between rat, human and non-human primate OFC. 
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2. Hypotheses of orbitofrontal function 
 
2.1 OFC function: evidence from behavioral experiments 
Early experiments had indicated that the OFC was involved in multiple roles: i) 
decision making and planning
12-19,62-67,91,182,207,208,237,241,271,272,274,290,296-299,306,338
 , ii) 
judging whether decisions made had failed and had long term severe 
consequences
13,19,62,66,290,360
, iii) and in the ability to identify and recall the implied 
meaning or importance of events/situations
13,62-67,78,91,272,274,290,297-299,311,338,342,343
.  These 
early hypotheses regarding the function of OFC were broad and ill defined. Later 
research in humans, non-human primates and rats would more precisely describe the role 
of the OFC in decision making.  
Early evidence indicated that OFC lesions resulted in highly emotional 
behavior
13,64,201
. Human subjects often behaved as if they had no recognition of future 
consequences and were only responding to simple Pavlovian cues
13,62,290
. Damasio 
postulated that the OFC played a primary role in the recognition of physiological changes 
that induced emotional changes such as anger or sadness
62,64,66
. He theorized that the role 
of the OFC would be to store different association patterns of external inputs with the 
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internal somatic states that may be produced by the external stimuli. A decision would 
then activate the somatic state most closely related to the paired external stimuli, biasing 
the decision. Damage to the OFC would make it difficult for human subjects to activate a 
particular somatic state which meant all choices would be emotionally equivalent.  
In reference to his patient EVR who suffered from bilateral OFC lesions,  
Damasio stated: 
“What we are proposing is that normal individuals can be assisted in this 
complex decision-making process by the appearance of a somatic signal 
that marks the ultimate consequences of the response option with a 
negative or positive somatic state. In other words, response option "A," 
regardless of its predictable immediate reward, can evoke a future 
scenario that is potentially threatening to the individual, and is marked by 
a negative somatic state. The perceiver would then experience the 
reenactment of punishment.” 
 
Although EVR still possessed the ability to categorize social situations and emotions he 
lacked the ability to use the information to successfully modify his behavior and select 
the appropriate responses
290
. EVR was not perserverative or impulsive and had no 
deficits in working memory or changes in intelligence
13,290
.  
Early evidence suggested that the OFC damage led to disruptions in behavior; 
human subjects were oblivious to the future consequences of their actions and continually 
selected large gains even when this action led to increasing large losses
13,15,62
. The Iowa 
Gambling Task was designed to test subjects with ventral medial prefrontal damage. 
They hypothesized, based on the deficits exhibited by EVR, that ventral medial prefrontal 
damaged patients would be oblivious to the future consequences of their actions and 
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would be guided only by the immediate rewards. In a simplified version of the Iowa 
Gambling Task, human patients selected cards from one of two decks (the original 
version of the task had four decks). Each deck had a different probability of reward. Deck 
A was high loss/high gain. Continued selections from Deck A would result in substantial 
losses. Deck B was low loss/low gain. Continued selections from Deck B would result in 
a small net gain. Damasio’s theory suggested that patients with OFC lesions would 
continue to select Deck A even though they were incurring substantial losses. Control 
subjects should switch to the low loss deck, Deck B. In order to make sure each deck was 
sampled, the first few cards in both decks were guaranteed wins.  
Subjects were allowed to freely choose cards from either deck. The first few cards 
in Deck A led to much higher gains than the first few cards in Deck B (loss cards were 
positioned in each deck such that a subject would have to draw multiple times from a 
deck to encounter a loss card). A typical control subject sampled each of the decks and 
after approximately 10 cards and encountering at least 1 loss card in each deck began to 
select almost exclusively from the low loss/low gain deck. A typical OFC lesioned 
subject, like control subjects, sampled each of the decks. However in contrast to controls, 
a typical OFC lesioned subject after the first approximately 5 cards began to select almost 
exclusively from Deck A. A typical OFC lesioned subject generally did not encounter 
any loss cards in the first 5 cards from Deck A. High loss cards were not encountered 
until after approximately 10 cards were drawn from Deck A.  
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Initially the most advantageous action would have been to continually select cards 
from Deck A until learning that Deck A resulted in large losses, then switch to Deck B. 
Control subjects readily changed their selections from Deck A to Deck B after 
encountering one loss card from each deck. However, OFC lesioned subjects continued to 
select cards from Deck A, preferring the high gain rewards even after encountering the 
high loss cards.  
The behavioral evidence that OFC lesioned subjects would continue to select the 
high risk deck leading to much greater losses supported the hypothesis that OFC lesioned 
patients disregarded future outcomes and instead were guided by immediate rewards. 
Patients without an intact OFC would disregard the high loss cards and continue to select 
from the high loss deck seemingly driven to select from Deck A to obtain the high gain 
cards
13,16,19
.  
2.1.1 Reversal learning 
Unpublished data from Bechara et. al. suggested that if the punishment was 
immediate in the Iowa Gambling task, OFC lesioned subjects would perform similarly to 
controls and avoid the large loss deck
13
. This evidence suggested that their previous 
hypothesis regarding the insensitivity to future losses was incomplete. Evidence from 
non-human primate data and rats expanded upon the role OFC played in behavior. OFC 
was hypothesized to be necessary for behavioral modification following a change in a 
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reward-cue association; OFC was necessary for the modification of choices, reversing 
learning, following a change in reward/cue association
19,27,39,53,85,119,122,127,189,199,274,307
.  
In a typical experiment designed to test reversal learning in rats, one type of 
reward, a banana flavored reward, would be paired with one cue, a yellow light. Every 
presentation of the yellow light would lead to a small banana reward. Another reward, a 
larger cherry flavored reward, would be paired with a red light.  Every presentation of the 
red light would lead to the larger cherry reward. After a rat had learned the pairing, the 
rewards would be reversed and paired with the other cues; the red light would lead to 
banana reward and the yellow light would lead to the larger cherry reward. All rats with 
an intact OFC would originally respond to the red light as it would lead to the larger 
cherry reward; however, once the cues and rewards were reversed (yellow = cherry, red = 
banana), the rats with the intact OFC would learn that the cues had reversed and begin 
responding for the yellow light to receive the larger, cherry reward. In contrast, a rat 
without a functioning OFC would persevere and continually select the red light even 
though it now led to the smaller banana reward.  
Rats
53,189
, humans 
19,85,119
 and non-human primates
39,122,127,199,201,270
 with lesions to 
the OFC cannot perform the reversals. However, OFC lesioned rats
53,301
, humans
85,119
, 
and non-human primates
13,19,199
 have no issues learning the initial cue and reward 
associations. Animals with bilateral OFC lesions are still capable of learning that a 
stimulus predicts food and still make correct choices to acquire 
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food
91,122,123,179,180,295,301,306,307
.  These results suggest that OFC is only responsible for 
learning when cue-reward pairs have changed and OFC is not necessary during initial 
learning.  
A later experiment using a modified Iowa Gambling Task in humans by Fellows 
and Farah showed that if the decks were shuffled and the cards intermixed, effectively 
eliminating specific rules from each deck, OFC lesioned subjects and control subjects 
were no different in the cards they selected
83
. In addition in a variation of the Iowa 
Gambling Task designed for rats, the Rat Gambling Task, Zeeb et. al. showed that OFC 
lesioned rats had no impairments in correctly selecting the most advantageous option; 
without a rule reversal OFC damage did not affect the performance of the lesioned 
rats
139,140
. These experimental results in human and rats were consistent with the 
hypothesis that the OFC was necessary for reversal learning and that the Iowa Gambling 
Task deficits reviewed above were dependent on the planned reversals within the card 
decks rather than the inability of the human subjects to reject 
losses
75,84,138,189,249,273,279,280,295,301,305,306,338,374
. 
One study casts doubt on the role of OFC in reversal learning at least in non-
human primates. Rudebeck et al demonstrated that prior lesion data in the non-human 
primate OFC may have been damaging fiber tracts
281,282
. This damage to the connecting 
fiber tracts may have resulted in the reversal learning deficits. This result conflicts with 
other results in non-human primates showing that OFC lesions result in reversal learning 
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deficits
122,127,199
. They indicated that if excitotoxic methods are used to accurately lesion 
OFC, rather than aspiration lesions (removal of tissue), non-human primates did not lose 
behavior flexibility in a reversal learning task. This result may not be generalizable to all 
non-human primates; the authors indicate that their results may apply only to humans and 
Old World monkeys (those primate species found in Africa and Asia which are more 
closely related to apes).  
This study may indicate most previous data regarding reversal learning in non-
human primates (and to a certain extent in humans) was an unintended result of extensive 
damage beyond the OFC. In humans, most subjects with OFC lesions had quite extensive 
damage that extended beyond the ventral medial OFC into more posterior and lateral 
regions of the frontal cortex
15,16
. Damage to these more posterior medial areas would 
have also damaged the fiber tracts consistent with the data shown in Rudebeck et al, 
implying that reversal learning impairments in humans and rats may also be the result of 
extensive fiber tract damage, rather than a specific function of OFC. Other data has 
suggested the damage to limbic structures in the temporal lobe resulted in impaired 
reversal learning
52,123,211
 and that these structures in non-human primates and rats heavily 
project to the posterior OFC (especially to the ventral and medial orbital areas in rats), via 
the uncinate fascicle
45,46,149,292,339
. Consequently this may mean that previous reversal 
learning deficits were a result of damage to the fiber tract connecting OFC to the limbic 
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structures in the temporal lobe. However, no experiments in rats have been able to 
dissociate OFC lesions and impairments in reversal learning. 
2.1.2 Response inhibition and other behavioral tests of OFC 
 The previous research showing that rats, humans, and non-human primates could 
not perform reward reversals led to the hypothesis that OFC was responsible for response 
inhibition, withholding a response when conditions leading to a reward had changed. This 
description, while accurately describing the inability of subjects to correctly select a 
reward following a reversal, could not explain the fact that subjects had no issues 
withholding responses prior to the reversal of the cues/rewards.  
More recently, devaluation experiments have proven that the OFC was not 
necessary for response inhibition
239,301,307
. In a devaluation experiment, one of the 
rewards is devalued by pairing that reward with illness after training. As before, the large 
cherry reward might be paired with the red light and the small banana with the yellow 
light. In a different environment, the large cherry reward would then be paired with 
lithium chloride which induced illness. OFC lesioned animals continue to respond to the 
red light and approach the large cherry reward, however, they do not consume the large 
cherry reward (as it had made them ill in a different location)  (Figure 2-1).  
Rats
36,91,238,239
 and non-human primates
10,122,123
 had no issue inhibiting their response to 
consume the now devalued food. One shortcoming of reversal learning experiments was 
that they were confounding the learning impairments (such as the inability of animals to 
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learn or acquire a new behavior or to extinguish an old behavior) with the performance of 
the animal using new information on a task. Animals rarely performed well following a 
reversal. Was this result a case of impaired performance or impaired learning? 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 Rats with OFC lesions fail to modify their behavior during odor discrimination reversal 
tasks.  
Top Panel. During training a rat learns to pair a specific odor with reward. Odor 1 is paired with sucrose. 
Odor 2 is paired with a quinine solution. When consumed the quinine solution makes the rat ill. When the 
correct odor is presented (odor 1) the rat will travel to the fluid well to receive the sucrose reward. If the 
other odor is encountered the rat will not travel to the reward well. The rat has learned that odor 2 predicts 
illness. Bottom Panel. Odor 1 is now paired with the quinine solution and odor 2 is paired with the sucrose 
solution. After several trials rats with an intact OFC will switch their responses; on odor 2 presentation the 
rat will travel to the well to receive the sucrose solution. On odor 1 presentation the rat will not travel to the 
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fluid well. Rats with OFC lesions will continue to respond to odor 1 even though it now predicts the 
quinine solution. Without a functioning OFC rats fail to modify their behavior (inhibit their responses) 
following cue or reward reversals. (used with permission
304
) 
 
 
The question then becomes how the OFC contributes to learning if it is not 
necessary for behavioral acquisition or for inhibiting reward consumption responses. This 
led to the hypothesis that OFC was representing some aspect of the relationship between 
the cue and the reward such as acquisitions of associative information
256
. Several 
experiments in rats have shown that the OFC is necessary for a cue to evoke a 
representation of the outcome, such as in a Pavlovian task where a cue is followed by a 
reward.  
In a Pavlovian over-expectation task, a rat is trained that several different cues 
predict different amounts of reward, then the cues are combined to measure if there was 
increased response for the reward. Following the previous example, a red light would 
produce a large cherry reward and a yellow light a small banana reward. Presenting both 
stimuli can be hypothesized to lead to overexpectation; both the red and the yellow light 
would be presented simultaneously. If the rat had learned that each cue predicted a 
different reward, the presentation of both lights would imply that both the cherry and the 
banana reward were available. According to the theory that OFC integrated cue and 
reward information, if cues signaled that more reward was available (by combining 
different reward cues), a rat should respond faster and more vigorously for that reward. 
However, when both cues were presented the rat found that only the large cherry reward 
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was available. No banana reward was present even though the cues had signaled banana 
reward was present. On subsequent presentations of the red light, the rat responded more 
slowly. The spontaneous reduction in the response to red light indicated that the previous 
expectation of more reward from both lights (and the violation of that expectation) had 
subsequently lowered the rat’s expectation of reward upon presentation of the red light. If 
the OFC was inactivated during the combination of the red and yellow lights, rats did not 
exhibit reduced response on subsequent presentations of the red light. This result 
suggested that the OFC was responsible for the integration of information from different 
cues predicting a new situation in which reward should have been increased
222,333,334
. The 
OFC has been found to be necessary to associate a cue that provided information 
regarding the expected reward with the actual reward, including delays
283
, spatial 
categories
81,261
, reward size
228,342
 and the specific flavors of the reward
128,192
.  
McDannald et al
128,192,193
 found that while OFC was necessary for representing 
the specifics of the outcome, such as identity (flavor), the ventral striatum was much 
more necessary for the formulation of general value of the expected reward. The OFC 
was necessary when learning an inferred value, which required that the information 
provided be integrated to form an estimate about a reward, but not when a stored, 
previously learned value was deemed sufficient. This indicated the OFC was important in 
the representation of specific expectations based on flavor, and differentiated itself from 
ventral striatum and other areas that may represent value. This research suggested that the 
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OFC had a much broader role in the representation and prediction of an outcome, instead 
of only being necessary for reversal learning and response inhibition. The OFC was 
hypothesized to have a different role in decision making, one that involved the formation 
of outcome expectations
302,305,306
; if I am in condition X, I can expect outcome Y.  
An important recent result has shown that the OFC is necessary to learn inferred 
value
128
. Rats were first trained to associate cue B with a reward and cue D with no 
reward. Once rats were able to successfully respond to the cue-reward pair to receive 
reward, another cue, cue A, was paired with the reward cue; cue A preceded and predicted 
cue B which led to reward: ABReward. A separate set of cues did not lead to reward, 
cue C preceded and predicted cue D which led to no reward; CDNo Reward. The 
first cue preconditioned the rat to respond to  the subsequent cue that was directly 
associated with reward. Rats reliably responded more for the cue that predicted the cue-
reward pair, showing increased responses to A compared to C. When OFC was 
inactivated, rats no longer responded differently to A compared to C. This result indicated 
that without a functioning OFC rats could no longer make the association between the 
preconditioned cue A and the cue associated with reward, cue B. However inactivation of 
the OFC did not affect the rats’ ability to respond for reward; rats still reliably responded 
to cue B which led to reward. Control rats continued to respond to cue A and approached 
the reward cup. 
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 To test the effect of OFC inactivation on learning, a group of rats from the 
preconditioning experiment underwent an additional experiment
128
. Rats were tested on 
an inferred value blocking task. Blocking occurred when one of the preconditioned cues 
(A or C) was paired with a new cue (X or Y); if X was paired with A and because A 
already predicted reward, X would provide no additional information (X+AReward 
compared to the preconditioning ABReward). Because X would not provide 
additional information, learning about X would be blocked. However, if Y was paired 
with C and reward was present, because C did not initially lead to reward, Y would 
supply information that reward was available (Y+CReward compared to the 
preconditioning CDNo reward). As a result, there should be no behavioral responses 
when X was presented by itself and increased responding when Y was presented by itself. 
When OFC was inactivated, rats showed similar responses for X and Y. This result 
indicated that a functioning OFC was necessary to infer that the previous cue A 
completely predicted the reward. In contrast, control rats with a functioning OFC did not 
respond for X and instead only showed increased response for Y. These results showed 
that the OFC was necessary to learn in complex inferences when a new cue either 
predicted a future reward or provided no additional information about reward. 
 The preconditioning results as well as other results showing OFC is necessary for 
devaluation in non-human primates and rats
59,91,122,238,241,366
 support the conclusion that 
OFC is responsible for more than reversal learning and is necessary for integrating 
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information about reward, cues and potential situations. Additionally, these results imply 
that OFC is not necessary for the representation of value; rats with an inactivated OFC 
still respond to the first order cue predicting reward, BReward.  
If OFC were necessary for value guided decisions in this preconditioning task, 
then rats with an inactivated OFC would not have been able to reliably respond to cue B 
for reward. They would not have been able to associate reward value with cue B and 
respond to cue B. The necessity of an intact and functioning OFC in preconditioning, 
blocking and learning an inferred value is also supported by other data which suggests 
that OFC is necessary for responding to changes in reward identity
192,193,222,309
. Although, 
without cellular responses (single neuron, fMRI, and neuronal population activity) any 
conclusion regarding the exact function of OFC and how it does or does not represent 
value or identity is difficult to support.  
2.2 OFC function: neural representations of value and outcome 
expectations 
Orbitofrontal cortex may have a much more specialized function in decision 
making, one that primarily involves the generation of expected outcomes and the value 
associated with those expected outcomes. Early neural recording experiments showed 
that neurons in OFC robustly responded to reward delivery as well as the cue that came to 
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predict reward delivery. This view was consistent with the idea that OFC was responsible 
for tracking reward receipt and modifying behavior if outcomes were no longer matching 
what was previously learned. What role does OFC play in decision making and can the 
neural activity in OFC be entirely explained by the representations of outcomes or 
specific value?  
2.2.1 Tracking outcome and reward 
Recording from single neurons in non-human primates and rats offers insight into 
the neural activity at the time of a particular behavior. If the OFC’s role in decision 
making is more complicated than simple reversal learning, then it should be expected that 
neuronal activity would not reliably follow reward reversal. Instead, the neuronal activity 
should reflect a combination of the cues necessary for reward receipt. Initial reports of 
single neuron activity seemed to agree with a simple role in reversal learning. A neuron 
would show preference for a specific reward by responding with increased activity to a 
particular reward or cue that predicted that reward. Single neuron studies reported that 
some neurons reversed their representation of reward following the reversal
59,91,272,338,362
. 
However, in one of the initial experiments in non-human primates that showed OFC 
neurons reversed their reward representations following reward reversal, only 22% of the 
neurons (70 of 317) varied their activity following the reversal
338
.  
In rats, 65% of neurons in the amygdala modify their activity during reward 
reversals compared to only 25% in the OFC
296,324
. Neurons in non-human primate 
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amygdala reverse their activity to match a change in outcome much more readily than 
OFC neurons
232
.  If the majority of neurons in OFC are not tracking reward reversals; 
OFC must have a larger role than modulating reversals. Instead OFC must represent some 
other aspects related to reward and how those different variables contribute to or result in 
a decision.  
The abundant evidence regarding the responses of OFC neurons to a variety of 
different aspects related to reward led to a different hypothesis, one that agreed with 
aforementioned findings in the lesion and inactivation studies; namely that OFC was 
responsible for encoding the relevant associations required to receive reward. This 
hypothesis again was incomplete since it meant that OFC neurons would rapidly reverse 
their activity following reward reversals. Single neuron recordings have shown that even 
if OFC neurons rapidly reversed their activity for reward, behavior in rats was much 
slower to reverse
323-325
. 
Although the previous idea that OFC was required for combining reward 
information and forming associations to facilitate rapid, flexible reversals was 
incomplete, it still captured a new idea in terms of OFC function; OFC neurons (and OFC 
as a whole) were encoding some aspect of the reward that allowed subjects to change 
their behavior to match the new cue and its associated outcome. Single neuron recordings 
indicated that many neurons in the OFC developed selective firing for reward. These 
neurons also started to become active during the cue that predicted the reward. Following 
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prolonged training, OFC neurons would fire for the cue that predicted the reward and 
again for the reward, often differentiating between several reward types. This activity 
occurred on every presentation of the reward and the cue
297
. This anticipatory activity 
occurred first in OFC before appearing elsewhere in the brain
297
. Single neuron 
recordings in non-human primates also showed that OFC neurons responded to the 
reward and the cue that predicted the reward
116,117,228,342,343,363
.  While there are few direct 
single neuron recordings from human OFC, functional magnetic resonance imaging 
studies have shown increased activation of the OFC during cues and reward 
presentations. However, this may not have reflected individual neuron activity and 
instead only reports increased blood flow to that area of cortex
99,219
. 
The neurophysiological evidence suggests that the OFC is representing the 
expected outcome. In rat OFC many neurons fire differently in anticipation of different 
rewards and the parameters of those rewards. These parameters include the delay until the 
reward is received or the odor predicting reward
261
 and different populations of neurons 
represent magnitude differences in reward
260,261
. Neurons representing magnitude for a 
reward do not fire for the other reward option
261
. Delay and reward identity are also 
represented but in different populations of neurons
260,261,327
. These different neuronal 
populations can be used to predict the expected reward fairly reliably
356,357
.  
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2.2.2 Reward prediction error 
While some data suggests the presence of reward-prediction-error information in 
OFC 
218,331,340
, other experiments suggest that OFC more closely tracks outcomes and 
value rather than prediction error
69,110,228
. If OFC were tracking reward prediction error, 
then OFC neurons would demonstrate similar activity to dopamine neurons found in the 
ventral tegmental area. Neurons in the VTA respond to unpredicted changes in reward by 
increasing their firing rate for unpredicted received rewards and decreasing their firing 
rate for unpredicted omitted rewards. If reward receipt does not change and can entirely 
be predicted, then neurons show no change in their responses
11,310
.  OFC neurons 
continue to respond even when the reward was expected. Compared to ventral tegmental 
area (VTA) dopamine neurons
11,230,311,359
, OFC neurons do not modify their activity when 
reward is received or withheld unexpectedly
262-264,297,308,326-328
 (Figure 2-2). In addition, in 
the absence of OFC input, VTA neurons fail to signal prediction error, indicating that 
OFC is necessary for reward prediction error to be calculated but does not directly 
compute reward prediction error
335
. These results indicate that while OFC is not directly 
calculating reward prediction error, an intact OFC is necessary for prediction error to 
occur downstream in the VTA
334,335
. 
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Figure 2-2 Differences between OFC and VTA during reward receipt.  
a During early learning, OFC reward responses increase immediately following reward receipt (dark blue 
trace). As the animal learns the task, reward related activity begins to increase immediately prior to 
receiving the reward (red trace). Once the animal has learned the task, reward activity increases following 
the cue that predicts the reward as well as increasing after the reward has been received. b During 
unexpected reward receipt (red trace), OFC neurons increase their activity shortly after receiving reward, 
potentially reflecting the somatosensory response to the reward receipt. Once the animal begins to expect 
reward, OFC neurons increase their response immediately upon reward receipt followed by a gradual 
decrease in activity (blue trace). If reward is omitted unexpectedly without any prior training, OFC neurons 
still respond to the moment in which reward would-have-been received then immediately decrease their 
firing rate (dotted red trace). This indicates that OFC neurons are representing an expectation of reward. c 
In contrast to OFC neurons, VTA neurons strongly increase following reward receipt (red trace). With each 
subsequent reward receipt, VTA neurons decrease their firing rate (blue trace). Eventually VTA neurons 
respond very little to expected reward (blue trace). If reward is omitted unexpectedly, VTA neurons 
decrease their activity (dotted red trace). (used with permission
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2.2.3 Specific economic value 
If OFC neurons are tracking different parameters of reward, it is possible that 
OFC neurons are representing some aspect of economic value, which is defined as how 
useful a reward is to the subject at that given instance. Past functional magnetic 
resonance imaging studies in humans alluded to the representation of value in OFC, 
specifically that cortical responses in OFC increased during the selection of potentially 
more valuable options
236
. Individual neuron responses in non-human primates have been 
found to track value as well
228
. 
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 Padoa-Schioppa and Assad found that neurons in the OFC tracked the economic 
value of different juice/reward offers
228
. Non-human primates were trained to select 
between different rewards, water and unsweetened kool-aid. The quantity and type of 
reward was represented by color and number of indicators seen on a screen. Offers were 
paired. The offer ratios varied. For example, they could select either 1 unit of water or 3 
units of kool-aid. In another trial the offer might have been 3 units of water to 1 unit of 
kool-aid. If subjects behaved rationally and economically, comparing the different offers 
to each other, each subject should exhibit preferences for the different rewards in each 
offer pair. A measured indifference point would then indicate under which offer 
quantities each juice was equally preferred.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, each subject showed distinct preferences between 
the offer pairs and had an indifference point where the two offers were equally preferred. 
Non-human primates behaved economically and generally equated 4(water):1(kool-
aid)
228
. For example, if the subject chose 1 kool-aid when offered with 1, 2, or 3 water, 
but not when 5 water were available, then 1 kool-aid would be equivalent to 4 water. If 4 
water and 1 kool-aid were offered both would be selected with equal frequency. Based on 
these preferences, non-human primates would select the offer, either kool-aid or water, 
that provided the best economic value to that subject.  
Neurons recorded from the medial OFC increased their firing rates for a preferred 
reward matching the increased selection preferences for that same reward. For example, a 
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neuron that coded the economic value of water fired maximally when a higher value 
water offer was paired with a lower value kool-aid offer. In this example, if the economic 
value of water and kool-aid were equivalent at 1(water):2 (kool-aid), then the neuron’s 
firing rate would not increase. As the amount of water offered increased when compared 
to the amount of kool-aid offered, the values offered were no longer equivalent. If 1 
water and kool-aid were offered (conceptually 1 water was valued approximately twice as 
much as 1 kool-aid), the neuron’s firing rate increased, potentially representing the 
increased economic value of the current offer (the water was more valuable economically 
to the subject than the kool-aid). In this example, the neuron would reach a maximum 
firing rate when the offer was 6 water:1 kool-aid. The maximal firing rate of that neuron 
would have indicated that the offer of 6 water to 1 kool-aid was the most economically 
valuable offer. 
Approximately 18% of neurons recorded in OFC represented some aspect of 
chosen economic value. However, this report was at odds with representation of expected 
outcome mentioned previously. If the OFC was representing the economic value of the 
outcome then the OFC could not be representing information regarding the outcome 
expectation, such as the attributes that predicted a specific outcome. 
 The representation of economic value is not equivalent to the representation of 
expected outcome. Economic value requires that different outcomes be compared and 
evaluated against each other. The representation of expected outcome requires that the 
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components necessary to predict the reward are included in the neural representation; it 
does not assign a value to each of the outcomes. If OFC neurons predict the outcome 
based on the current cues, situation, and other available indicators rather than formulate a 
specific economic value between the available rewards, then OFC neurons should show a 
change in activity to any cue or object that predicts a certain reward rather than only 
responding for reward. 
A key tenet of economic and rational decision making is that the choices between 
options be range adapting and menu invariant
97
. Range adaptation allows a representation 
of reward to dynamically scale to the magnitude of the reward options available. This 
change would allow a single neuron to represent economic value in multiple situations 
when comparing multiple different types of rewards. Menu invariance specifies that all 
rewards offered are reduced to a single value unit, a common currency that can be 
maintained and directly compared across all pairs and combinations of reward. The 
responses for a given reward remain the same even if that reward is paired with a 
different reward. Menu invariance may lead to stable economic preferences over 
time
223,227
.  
If the OFC was calculating the economic value, then the representations in OFC 
must be range adapting and menu invariant (neuronal activity would not depend on the 
rewards being paired). Range adapting neurons should scale their activity to the type and 
value of the rewards available. A range adapting neuron’s responses will adapt to the 
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minimum and maximum scale of reward available. If the options range from one drop of 
juice to three drops of juice, a juice preferring OFC neuron would respond maximally for 
three drops of juice. If in a different instance, the offers are now three drops of juice and 
five drops of juice, the neuron would now respond maximally for five drops of juice and 
minimally for the three drops of juice (even though three drops was the previous 
maximum reward available). The neuron has adapted to the range of the available 
rewards. Menu invariance refers to the ability of the neurons to respond to rewards 
independent of the reward types being paired; grape juice responsive neurons will 
respond the same for grape juice regardless if the grape juice is paired with orange juice 
or apple juice. 
Later work by Padoa-Schioppa in non-human primates indicated that neurons in 
non-human primate OFC did in fact adapt to the range of the values represented 
226
. 
Neurons in OFC encoded values in a linear function. In addition, OFC neuron responses 
were menu invariant, neuronal activity was consistent according to the good being 
represented and did not differ based on the goods available 
227
.  
It should be noted subjects in the non-human primate experiments had substantial 
experience with each of the presented offer pairs. They had been trained on the task for 6-
8 months prior to the recording sessions
225,228
. A single recording session consisted of up 
to 2400 trials with the same set of reward pairs (on average 1500 per day). Under these 
conditions, it may be expected that the animal would become quite adept at selecting and 
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ranking the available rewards. Due to their extensive training, it is quite possible that the 
primates became experts at determining the tradeoffs between each reward offered. 
Additional data from rat neural recordings indicates that rats performing in a similar task 
with much less training showed stronger neural activity for outcome representations 
independent of value
260,261
.  
Results from human imaging experiments have been less clear about economic 
value representations in OFC. General value signals have been found in OFC
4,42,99
. 
However, these studies have not specifically correlated OFC activity with any measure of 
economic value. The results instead implied that OFC was representing rewards in a 
common currency, reducing each reward offer into a value unit that can be directly 
compared. Increased activity as measured by fMRI showed that higher valued items, 
regardless of the item types being compared, elicited stronger responses
50,130,177
. 
If value is being represented in OFC as a common currency, a neuron’s firing rate 
should increase proportionally to the summed value of the combined rewards; if two 
reward predicting cues are combined indicating twice as much reward is available, a 
neuron should double its firing rate to reflect that the current reward is twice as valuable. 
Neural data from rats suggests that OFC cannot be encoding economic value because the 
firing rate of OFC neurons does not sum to reflect that the amount of reward may have 
doubled
333
.  
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In an over-expectation task, Takahashi et. al. trained rats to expect different 
rewards from four different cues, A13 Banana pellets, A20 pellets, A33 Grape 
pellets, V3 Banana pellets333. When rats encountered combined cues for the first time, 
A1+V, OFC cue-reward responsive neurons spontaneously increased their activity. 
Neurons that had responded to each cue independently did not double their firing rate. 
Instead the new firing rate in response to the combined cues was much stronger than a 
doubling of the firing rate (A1 & V > A1 + V)
333
.  
These results are inconsistent with the common currency and value explanation of 
OFC function. The summation of firing rates did not reflect the summation of the 
rewards. Instead the firing rate was much higher than twice the firing rate as would have 
been predicted by twice as much reward. In addition, because the firing rate for the 
combined cues exceeded the neurons previous firing rates for a single cue, the neural 
activity was not range adapting, in contrast to the data reported from non-human primates 
by Padoa-Schioppa
226
. This raises an important question; does OFC activity reflect 
economic value, expected outcome or something else entirely?  
2.2.4 Representation of task parameters  
The conflict between the specific economic value hypothesis and the outcome 
expectation hypothesis can be addressed by looking at neural representations of all the 
different aspects leading up to and predicting the reward including the reward 
representations themselves. If multiple, different variables that predict reward are being 
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represented in OFC neural activity then OFC is representing more than just specific 
economic value. 
Single neuron activity in rats (as well as a recent study in non-human primates
178
) 
strongly suggests that OFC is representing the different aspects of outcome expectation 
rather than just economic value
81,142,261-263,296-299,327,328
. The neurons in rat OFC respond to 
many attributes and cues predictive of the reward such as the reward direction left or 
right of the rat
81,261
, the odor that predicts the current reward
91,296,298,299,321,356,357
, the 
specific flavor of the reward
298,327
, the delay until reward
261
, imagined outcomes if reward 
cues are combined signaling a potential for increased reward
333
 and even the reward that 
could have been received, in rats
327,328
 and non-human primates
1
.  
If OFC is not representing the specific value and is instead representing general 
value, including the salient aspects of reward, then the previous evidence of economic 
value representations in OFC should be sensitive to task settings (framing effects). Newer 
evidence from Padoa-Schioppa in non-human primates indicates that the OFC represents 
a more general value/outcome and is subject to framing effects, such as when the 
situation changes or the general state changes, the values modify
223,228,229
. In addition, 
recent evidence in human fMRI supports the hypothesis that the OFC is involved in the 
specific representation of outcome expectations
50,79,99,110,146,154,318,347
, both real and 
imagined
33
, that the OFC is sensitive to the task context
242
 and that the OFC is more 
likely to represent  the specific categories of the reward rather than just the specific 
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economic value
196
. All of this evidence from fMRI supports the hypothesis that OFC is 
responsible for the generation of outcome expectations. 
The increasing evidence, both neural and behavioral, suggests that the OFC is 
representing specific, expected outcomes. This hypothesis predicts that the OFC is 
involved in reward expectations under specific conditions identified by any variables 
relating to the reward. These representations include the formulation of the 
counterfactual, an alternative reward not received, and the representation of regret
300
. If 
this is true, OFC neurons are capable of integrating the current information about 
expected rewards and representing previously missed rewards; the representation of the 
reward that could have been received. The additional knowledge provided by these 
representations in OFC will expand the current understanding of how OFC works to 
include the representation of imaginary past outcomes (a corollary to the neural 
representations of imagined future outcomes in rats
333
 and the neural representation of 
cued, hypothetical outcomes in non-human primates
1
), linking the representations of 
outcomes to episodic future thinking and how errors in decision making modify future 
actions. 
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3. Defining regret 
 
 
What differentiates regret and disappointment? Both require the knowledge that 
the current offer is less than desirable. In the psychology literature, disappointment is 
defined as the realization that an expected outcome is less than the previously conceived 
outcome
95,156-158,197,198,258; more specifically, disappointment is ‘sorrow caused by 
circumstances beyond one’s control’ or as the outcome decided by nature15,24-26,31-33. 
Economics defines disappointment as the value of an action being less than expected in 
the presence of a singular choice
22-24,173,174
. 
Regret is defined as the value of an action being less than expected in the 
presence of multiple choices. Regret is the realization that the action selected, of multiple 
available actions, has led to a value less than the alternative actions. In the simplest sense 
regret can be conceptualized as an emotion of the counterfactual, where the emotional 
response generated by regret results from the realization that the alternative choice would 
have been a better choice
22-24,41,56-58,173,174,286. Regret has been described as the ‘mental 
undoing of events’ in the presence of an action/outcome that is less than the previously 
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available action would have produced
133-135,156,158,346
.  Regret cannot occur without the 
prior counterfactual
22-24,105,106,173,174,287-289
.  
3.1 Counterfactuals 
Counterfactual thinking was defined by its linguistic meaning, as ‘contrary to the 
fact’ 156,370. Most definitions of counterfactuals were relegated to uses in defining 
linguistic arguments. Gradually, counterfactual thinking began to influence the formation 
of laws as well, with the principle sine qua non, Latin for “could the result have happened 
with the act”157. This form of counterfactual reasoning required that the alternative 
outcome be considered when determining the accountability of person’s action.  
Counterfactuals have been described as a set of ‘conditionals that were based on 
the different similarity of the worlds, or states’167. In situations that could lead to different 
outcomes, there were a finite number of states that could be potentially described or 
imagined to which the current situation could hypothetically transition. The American 
philosopher David Lewis postulated that for counterfactuals to exist and be based on 
reality they must have been consistent with the laws of nature (of a given state, where the 
state included all the necessary information and possible actions a person could use to 
make a decision), that the potential states could in fact occur, and that the counterfactual 
in no way could violate the laws of nature
167
. The imagination of future states and 
consequences may be an inevitable consequence of conflicting choices and situations in 
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nature
105
. In relationship to animal behavior, counterfactuals could be associated with 
approach and avoidance behavior. If an encounter was unpleasant, a counterfactual 
representation of the alternative would allow an animal to switch its behavior to avoid 
unpleasantness
34,267,268
. This would functionally allow an animal to switch its behavior to 
a more appropriate behavior without having to experience the unpleasantness again. 
Deviations from the expected behaviors or expected results would cause the formation of 
the counterfactual especially if the previous outcome were controllable by the animal
200
. 
The counterfactual would result in the representation of the alternate expectation
35,132,135
.  
In order to represent counterfactuals, the alternative outcomes must be (or could 
have been) possible to achieve from the current situation, the decision maker must be 
capable of selecting the options available to achieve the alternative outcome and the 
decision maker must be able to identify the causal nature of the actions preceding the 
outcome
23,51,105,106,156,157,171,173,174,267,268,289
. By definition the counterfactual is a causal 
statement acknowledging that an action will lead to a alternative, specific outcome
136
. 
The counterfactual simulates the outcomes of potentially different results had a different 
action been chosen
155
. For example if two dice were thrown, there would be 35 different 
‘worlds’ possible, only one of those worlds could be physically represented, all other 
representations would be the counterfactuals to the current world
155
. The construction of 
the counterfactual occurs by converting potential outcomes into possible precursors thus 
regenerating the expectancies
268
.  
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The representation of the counterfactual must be present to compare alternative 
outcomes to each other
98
. In decision making, counterfactuals are necessary for the 
experience of regret. Without the representation of the counterfactual, there are no 
hypothetical outcomes to compare to and therefore regret cannot exist. 
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3.2 Psychology of regret 
In the simplest sense, regret is the recognition that the current situation is worse 
than an alternative situation. This definition of regret first arose from the 
conceptualization of regret as a pure emotion, the recognition of the emotional response 
following a bad series of choices
20,278
. Only later was regret defined in terms of actions 
and outcomes both real and imagined. The definition of regret in terms of actions and 
outcomes would lead to the economic definition of regret.  
The word regret is derived from Scandinavian and Norse words, regrete and grata 
which is defined as ‘to weep’156. Early mentions of regret in classic literature and 
psychology describe regret purely as an affective emotion
38,95,156,158
. The transition of 
regret from an emotional descriptor to a cognitive state began in the 1940’s. Burks 
postulated that regret is the recognition that the actions within a given state of nature did 
not satisfy the expectation and that alternative actions would have produced a more 
desirable outcome, thus satisfying the expectation
38
.  
If regret is assumed to occur in a specific instance of nature, then the experience 
of regret would require that the alternative outcome is known as well as the proprieties of 
that outcome (antecedents of) and how they relate to the current situation. Any decision 
between multiple options would therefore result in outcomes with ‘real potencies’, or 
real-world implications. The state in which the regret experience occurred was described 
as an emotional recognition
23,102,174,294,312
.  
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Landman proposed that regret was generated more readily in instances that 
produced less than ideal events
156
. Regret was hypothesized to be a larger function of 
inductive thought involving facts and counter-facts, from a given set of cases to a wider 
set of cases. Though she reasoned that regret, while depending on the counterfactuals 
‘was a distinctly psychological phenomenon’, regret could also be conceptualized as an 
emotional phenomenon. Others had specified that regret depended upon the 
representation of alternative selves, that contained the complete cognitive and emotional 
information in a hypothetical state
58,62,66,95,197,258,285
.  
Regret has been suggested to be a consequence of rationality, a measure of how 
realistic a subject’s goals are in relation to the current reality129. Thus, if regret is a 
consequence of rationality, then a subject behaving rationally would avoid the experience 
regret 
105,156
. However, if a subject experiences regret, then a subject has made an 
irrational decision; therefore regret is the failure to rationalize one’s behavior. If 
economics can be used to operationalize what is rational and what is not rational 
behavior, then it is possible to describe regret using economics. An economic definition 
of regret provides an explicit set of circumstances under which regret can occur. With an 
explicit set of conditions that should induce regret, testing for the existence of regret 
becomes feasible. 
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3.3 Economics of regret 
The economists Loomes, Sugden and Bell stated that regret played an important 
role in rational, economic decision making because many subjects behaved in ways that 
violated rational decision making. Regret theory could potentially explain violations of 
rational behavior such as  why a subject would exhibit preference reversals; initially 
preferring a chocolate to a grape, but later preferring a grape to a chocolate. Subjects 
could reverse their  preferences if they regretted choosing a chocolate to a grape, 
subsequently selecting a grape when offered a grape and a chocolate again. Introducing 
regret into the decision making process allowed regret to modify future choices by 
comparing the difference between the possible rewards and the currently received 
rewards; a suboptimal (and seemingly irrational) choice may be selected to avoid regret. 
Regret is defined in economics as the difference in value between two known 
actions/outcomes in a specific situation, where the outcomes and results of the actions are 
assumed to be known or capable of being conceptualized
23,174
. Regret Theory assumes 
that an agent is rational and maintains the following: 
1) There exists a usefulness function that is capable of being represented without 
an agent choosing and experiencing the outcome (choiceless), where the value 
of the options is assigned independent of the choices and prior to obtaining the 
outcome of the options (the choice has yet to be made); the value of the goods 
is anticipated prior to the actual decision. 
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2) The usefulness function is defined and independent to (and prior to) the choice 
of the agent. 
3) The agent has knowledge of what all action/outcome pairs will be and their 
relative value in the given situation. 
4) The measure of regret is dependent only on the choiceless usefulness of the 
two possible consequences (the counterfactual, ‘what might-have-been’, and 
the reality, ‘what is’). 
5) The regret function assigns a value to every possible action/outcome pair and 
the value assignment is explicit to the state the agent is in; any future states 
cannot be assumed to have the same regret function unless their conditions 
exactly match the initial state. 
 
For a specific situation, the utility in regret theory is defined as 
Utility(choice1,choice2) where utility is the usefulness of the outcome in the current 
situation and choice1 is selected simultaneously rejecting choice2. The best possible 
action minimizes the regret function defined as the value(choice1)-value(choice2) where 
R(.) is the regret function 
23
.  
 
                                                              
 
If an agent were to choose        1 over        2 in an explicit state of the world the 
resultant value v(       1) would occur and the counterfactual value/action would be 
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represented as v(       2).This formulation lets the regret function represent a real value 
for each possible increase or decrease in the value of an option. The regret function can 
increase or decrease the relative value of the selected action.  
When translating Regret Theory to the economics of choice, the experience of 
regret relies on the probabilities of receiving the specific outcomes in that situation being 
known. Regret is defined as the difference between the payoff on a given trial and the 
maximum (expected) payoff. In this context regret again modifies the future actions by 
either increasing or decreasing the value of a choice, where the value of a choice is highly 
correlated with the prior experience of regret, higher potential regret over the loss of an 
outcome associated with a choice increases the willingness to select that choice and its 
resultant outcome (the regret function increases the value of the action that leads to the 
outcome)
171,174,175,258,375,379
.  
Economic definitions of regret rely on simulation heuristics, formulating the 
potentially experienced regret prior to a decision and minimizing future regret by either 
prospectively avoiding situations that would induce regret, or by modifying actions 
following a regret experience to avoid future regret
23,174,375,379
. Prior to the explicit 
definition of regret, regret was identified as a special form of decision-making; regret was 
the result of mental simulation and required the comparison of states and expected 
outcomes
133
. If the outcome violated the expected outcome in the subsequent state, regret 
was experienced. This early economic definition of regret could not be differentiated 
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from disappointment. Therefore regret as defined later by economists Bell, Loomes and 
Sugden differentiated between regret and disappointment, regret being a comparison 
between two outcomes where an error was the result of an agent’s action and 
disappointment was a singular outcome that was not the fault of the agent
23,174
.  
The economic definition of regret agrees with psychological definitions of regret, 
both definitions state that regret is unique to each experience
23,156,157,172,198,258
. Even if a 
subject is in a similar situation again, the regret experienced will not be the same; ‘If I 
was in that situation again, I would probably make a different choice’23,174. The regret 
function cannot be expected to be the same across multiple situations; each experience 
leads to a different experience of regret and potentially different choices
23,174
.  
By using these definitions of regret, the effects of regret on decision making in 
economics can be identified and separated from disappointment. The modifications 
introduced by regret theory to rational decision making address how a subject’s 
preferences may shift after experiencing regret and can explain irrational choices. Once 
the counterfactual exists, the experience of regret is possible. Disappointment and regret 
are differentiated through the representation of the counterfactual. Regret is the 
representation (the counterfactual) of the more valuable alternative action and the 
associated outcome had the agent selected the more valuable alternative option.  
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If disappointment is strictly defined as the outcome being worse than expected 
determined by conditions beyond the agents’ control then disappointment can be 
differentiated from regret through the representation of the counterfactual. These 
definitions of regret and disappointment make it possible to design and conduct 
experiments that identify: 
 the counterfactual  
 regret  
 disappointment 
 
This raises some important questions; can the counterfactual and regret be identified in 
rats by using the economic framework outlined above and does OFC play a role in the 
formulation of the counterfactual and regret agreeing with counterfactual representations 
in non-human primate OFC neurons
1
 and that the activation of OFC during the 
experience of regret in humans
56
? 
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4. Identifying reward representations on Multiple-T Left- 
Right-Alternate: evidence of the counterfactual in rats 
4.1 Introduction 
When faced with a difficult decision, rats and humans sometimes pause and orient 
back-and-forth towards options or paths, a behavior termed vicarious trial and error 
(VTE) 
125,150,210,231,341
. During VTE and similar behaviors, neural signals in hippocampus 
and ventral striatum show evidence of covert decision-making processes 
125,126,351,353
. 
Here we report that neural representations of reward in the OFC of behaving rats 
increased following VTE events at a decision-point, implying representation of the 
expected rewards during an internal, self-initiated decision. 
Neural representations of reward in rodent OFC increased immediately following 
each re-orientation, implying a transient representation of the expected outcome 
following self-initiated decisions. Upon reaching reward locations and finding no reward 
(having made an error), OFC representations of reward decreased locally indicating a 
disappointment signal that then switched to represent the unrewarded, non-local, would-
have-been rewarded site. These results illustrate that following a decision to act, neural 
ensembles in OFC represent reward, and upon the realization of an error, represent the 
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reward that could have been. We report that, at reward locations on error trials, when no 
reward was present, neural representations of reward in OFC of behaving rats decreased, 
indicating a neural correlate of disappointment. 
Here, we report that, when faced with a lack of delivered reward (disappointment) 
after making a decision (implying the potential for regret), neural representations in rat 
OFC switched from encoding the local, unrewarded site, to encoding the non-local 
would-have-been-rewarded site, representing a neural signal of the counterfactual 
necessary for regret. In summary, following a decision to act, neural ensembles in OFC 
represent the expectation of reward, potentially guiding future evaluative processes, and 
upon the realization of an error, represent the reward that could-have-been. 
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4.2 Methods 
4.2.1 Animals 
Four Fisher Brown Norway rats aged 10-12 months at the start of behavior were 
used in this experiment. Prior to training, rats were handled for two weeks. On the last six 
days of the two week period, normal Teklad pellets were replaced with flavored pellets 
within the rats’ home cage. Rats had access to 15 grams of white (unflavored), fruit-
flavored, or banana-flavored, presented in random order during handling. Each flavor was 
presented once per day no more than twice during the six day sequence. Rats were 
housed on a 12 h light/dark cycle and training/probe trials occurred during the same time 
each day. During testing, rats were maintained at roughly 85% of their free feed weight. 
Rats had access to water at all times. All training procedures were in accordance with the 
National Institutes of Health guidelines and approved by the Institutional Animal Care 
and Use Committee at the University of Minnesota.  
4.2.2 Behavior: the Multiple-T-LRA task 
We trained 4 rats on a continuous loop, multiple choice, maze task (Figure 4-1). 
Reward was delivered under Left (L), Right (R), or Alternation (A) schedules (MT-LRA) 
30,103
. The Multiple T maze consisted of a figure-8 topology, with a central navigation 
sequence leading to a high-cost choice point. The choice-point led to two, different return 
rails. Each had two feeders (Med-Associates, St. Albans VT) and potentially provided 2x 
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45mg food pellets (Research Diets, New Brunswick, NJ, USA) each. The navigation 
sequence consisted of three low-cost choice points, at which the rat could turn around if 
he made a wrong choice. After a choice at the high-cost choice point at the end of the 
navigation sequence, the rat had to continue down the return rails before coming around 
for another lap. The left return rail provided banana-flavored pellets at the first feeder-
site, and unflavored (white) pellets at the second feeder-site; the right return rail provided 
fruit-flavored pellets at the first feeder and unflavored (white) pellets at the second 
feeder-site. During training, if a rat tried to run backwards on the navigation sequence or 
backwards from the second feeder to the first feeder on one of the return rails or from one 
feeder side to the other across the top rail, the rat’s path was blocked by the experimenter 
with a PVC pipe. However, by the recording sessions, rats never turned around and did 
not need to be blocked.  
The navigation sequence remained constant within a day, but changed from day to 
day. Whether reward was provided on a return rail or not depended on the choices made 
by the rat. Three reward contingencies were used: (L) turn left for reward, in which the 
left return rail always provided reward and the right did not, (R) turn right for reward, in 
which the right return rail always provided reward and the left did not, and (A) alternate 
for reward, in which the return rail not previously visited was rewarded. In the alternation 
(A) contingency, the first return rail visited was always rewarded on a given day. All 
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reward site locations and flavors at each reward site were constant across all sessions. On 
a correct lap, reward was always presented. On error laps, reward was never presented.  
 
 
Figure 4-1 Multiple T–LRA Task Behavior.  
Rats were placed at the start of the maze (S). Reward was delivered as animals crossed the reward-trigger 
lines. Reward trigger zones were spatially defined and did not vary from day to day. On any given the day, 
if the rat chose correctly, once he passed into the zone, pellets were delivered. Each side had two feeders, 
one flavored, one unflavored. Flavors at reward sites remained constant across all sessions
328
. 
 
 
Rats ran one 40 minute session per day. Contingencies were presented in a 
pseudorandom order across days. The rat did not receive any cues informing it of the 
rewarded contingency. On each day, the rat was placed at the start of the maze and 
allowed to run through the navigation sequence and turn left or right at the final choice 
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point for reward, but it did not know which contingency it faced. Rats were trained for an 
average 24 days on this task before surgery, until they were performing all three 
contingencies (L, R, A) reliably. 
Following surgery, rats were allowed to recover for 2-4 days, during which they 
had free access to food and water. After 2-4 days, rats were returned to the Multiple-T-
LRA task. Recordings commenced when the rats returned to running a number of laps 
comparable to pre-surgery. To acclimate to the additional weight of the tether and 
hyperdrive implant before the probe sequence began, the rats were trained for several 
more days while tetrodes were advanced to target sites.  
Following adaption to the increased running weight and achievement of large 
ensemble sizes, rats began the 6 day probe sequence. A probe day entailed a change in 
contingency after 18 to 22 minutes. Thus, the rat faced one of the three contingencies 
(left, right, or alternation) for approximately 20 minutes, and then faced a new 
contingency for the second 20 minutes. Rats were not removed from the maze at the 
switch, nor were they signaled as to the switch. During probe sessions, the fourth T was 
always aligned to the middle of the top rail. This ensured that the path length from the 
high-cost choice point did not change to either the left return-rail or the right return-rail. 
We ran six probe days: left/right, right/left, left/alternation, right/alternation, 
alternation/left, alternation/right. Each rat saw all six probe days, but the order of the six 
probe days was randomized between rats.  
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4.2.3 Surgery 
After an initial phase of pre-training and after the rats had reached behavioral 
criterion, rats were chronically implanted with 14 tetrode-hyperdrives (Kopf). Targets 
were the ventral OFC, AP +3.5, ML +2.5. Implants were alternated on each rat, such that 
two implants were right centered and two were left centered. Surgical procedures were 
performed as described previously 
125
. All tetrode locations were histologically verified to 
lie in the ventral orbitofrontal cortex (Figure 4-2). 
 
 
Figure 4-2 Histology.  
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All recordings were confirmed to be in orbitofrontal cortex. The implantation sites were alternated. All 
recordings were in the lateral orbital frontal cortex, which corresponds to more lateral aspects in human and 
primate neuroanatomy 
152,328
. 
4.2.4 Data acquisition 
Rats were tracked by an overhead camera system via Neuralynx (camera 1). A 
second camera (camera 2) was centered on T4 to increase positional recording accuracy 
and to serve as a set spatial window for high-cost choice point (T4) passes. Data for the 
calculation of orient-reorient behavior, defined as VTE, was taken exclusively from the 
spatial window defined by the second camera at T4. Before surgery, rats were tracked 
from an LED attached to a in-house-built backpack; after surgery, rats were tracked from 
LEDs built into the headstage attached to the implanted hyperdrive. 
Unit recording 
Unit and local field potential activity was monitored as the tetrodes were 
advanced. Once the tetrodes began to approach approximately 4.2mm in depth, tetrodes 
were advanced no more than 80 microns per day to allow the tissue to stabilize. Once 
LFP and units were stable, tetrodes were moved to find the largest possible ensemble.  
We recorded neural activity on a 64 channel Cheetah recording system 
(Neuralynx, Bozeman MT). Session data were recorded to disk and units were identified 
offline using MClust 3.5. Pre-clusters were formed automatically using Klustakwik. 
During recordings the position of the rat was tracked using colored LEDs on the 
headstage. The position was time stamped and recorded in Cheetah by the overhead 
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camera and a second camera centered on T4. A total of 712 cells were recorded. Cell 
yields were distributed across four rats; R171: 173 cells; R172: 252 cells; R183: 137 
cells; R186: 150 cells. Because the recordings were conducted over multiple days it is 
difficult to rule out that some cells may have been recorded multiple times. Because 
results were consistent across multiple rats, we remain confident that our results are not 
due to re-sampling. Analyses that are over-conservative for re-sampling also produce 
similar results.  
4.2.5 Data analysis 
Behavior: Path Linearization 
In order to compare multiple sessions of differing paths, the 2D tracking data was 
mapped to the closest point in a 1D path 
293,352
. Each path had 7 landmarks (Start of 
Maze, T1-T4, both feeders) with a set number of points between landmarks. The data 
between each landmark was assigned to a fixed number of spatial bins. Because T4 was 
centered along the top rail on probe sessions, the path length from T4 to the first feeder 
on either side was equidistant on all probe sessions.  
 
Behavior: Laps 
A lap was defined as a complete loop from the start of the maze to the middle of 
the bottom rail prior to the start of maze zone. Lap times were defined as the time elapsed 
from when the rat crossed into the navigation sequence, passed through the feeder zones 
 56 
 
and finally crossed back into the start of the maze zone. Laps that did not include feeder 
passes, either correct or incorrect, were excluded. In practice this only occurred when the 
40 minute session ended with the rat between the start of the maze and T4. On correct 
laps, the rat was rewarded by 2x pellets at each feeder. On error laps no reward was 
presented.  
 
Behavior: Vicarious-trial and error behaviors (VTE, zIdPhi) 
In order to quantify VTE behaviors, we measured the integrated angular velocity 
(zIdPhi) through the choice-point pass 
231
. A choice-point (T4) pass was defined by entry 
and exit times through the field of view of camera 2. First, the velocity of the animal was 
calculated using a modified, discrete-time adaptive window for velocity estimation 
124
. 
We used the change in the velocity vectors, dx and dy, to calculate an angle of motion, 
and then used the velocity estimation algorithm to calculate the momentary change in 
angle, dPhi. Integrating dPhi over the duration of the choice point pass, defined by the 
box in Figure 4-1, resulted in a measure of IdPhi which we used to quantify the behavior 
on a single lap. The IdPhi scores were normalized by z-scoring across laps for each 
session for each rat. The z-scored measure, zIdPhi, was compared across all animals and 
sessions. This measure proved to be a reliable assessment of the rat’s behavior see Figure 
4-3 
231
. The behavior we observed, previously classified as VTE, was quantitatively 
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defined as zIdPhi>0.5, during which rats reliably demonstrated visible orienting-
reorienting behavior 
210,341
.  
 
Behavior: Reorientation events 
Reorientations were identified at times when the rat performed an abrupt change 
in direction at T4 (Figure 4-3, black arrows). These events were clearly visible in the 
tracking data. 
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Figure 4-3 Identifying vicarious trial and error (VTE) events. 
The colored boxes refer to the VTE distribution in the bottom left corner as scored by zIDphi. Each pass 
through camera 2’s field of view is shown in light grey, individual passes (once per lap) through the field of 
view are highlighted in red. Low zIdPhi passes were the most common and demonstrated little behavior 
indicative of zIdPhi (Blue squares). High VTE passes were less common however they demonstrated large, 
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head swings from one direction to the other (Yellow and Red boxes/ arrows on the histogram on bottom 
left, black arrows on individual behavioral traces from camera 2). 
328
 
 
4.2.6 Single-unit analysis 
Reward sensitivity 
To determine the reward responsivity of a unit, we first calculated a peri-event-
time-histogram (PETH) from -1.5 seconds to 3.5 seconds following feeder triggering 
using a time step of 100ms. In order for a neuron to be classified as reward responsive, 
we compared the number of spikes fired during the 2.5 seconds following triggering of 
the feeder (reward delivery, 0 seconds to 2.5 seconds) to 500 bootstrapped samples of the 
same duration aligned to random times throughout the session. If the activity during the 
reward epoch was significantly different than the bootstrapped samples the cell was 
classified as reward responsive.  
 
Decoding 
All decoding was performed using a one-step Bayesian decoding method with a 
time-step of 250ms 
380
, measuring the probability that the neural ensemble decoded to a 
given spatial location on the maze. Only cells with >100 spikes and data sets with > 14 
cells were included in the analyses. We first calculated the linearized tuning curves for 
each cell during each session. Training sets were extracted from steady state 
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performance. To control for tautology, any test sets used were excluded from the tuning 
curves in the training sets.  
 
Shuffled control data.  
In order to ensure that the non-local decoding seen in the results does not arise 
from random firing, we tested our decoding algorithm using tuning curves derived from 
actual firing patterns and shuffled spike trains. Shuffled spike trains preserves cell 
identity and the first-order firing statistics of each cell. This allowed us to test whether 
increased random activity during pauses, at the choice point or at the feeders, could 
account for the increased decoding to the reward locations.  
 
Decoding p(Reward) 
To construct p(Reward), each side of the maze was linearized to control for 
differing lengths in the central portion of the maze (T1 through T4) on different days. 
This produced two separate loops, left and right (Figure 4-4a,b). Once the maze was 
linearized, we calculated the spatial tuning curves for all cells on left and right portions of 
the maze. Because rewards are only delivered at specific locations on the maze, cells 
which fire primarily in response to reward will drive the spatial location on each loop 
towards the reward locations. On this task, reward reliably occurs at specific locations on 
the maze. For example, a cell that fired for banana flavored reward would fire most on 
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the left loop (Figure 4-4b). It is important to note that successful decoding to reward 
locations does not imply that spatial information is encoded in OFC ensembles. Rather 
we are using a spatial algorithm to provide information regarding the presence or absence 
of reward. During VTE, decoding was calculated using all cells. 
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Figure 4-4 Decoding Locations. 
Probability of reward refers to the probability of the rat being at the rewarded site given the spikes that are 
observed. Because reward sites are fixed in space, a decoding algorithm initially designed to determine 
predictions in space also reflects the probability of the rat being at a reward site. Since neurons are 
quantified as being reward responsive based on the presence or absence of reward, the spatial decoding 
algorithm allows us to the measure the likelihood of receiving reward when the animal is at the reward site, 
p(Reward). It should be noted that we make no claims that OFC represents space. When calculating the 
probability of reward (p(Reward)) for the rightward loop, only the two right feeder locations (a) are 
considered in the calculation of p(Reward). Conversely, when considering the leftward loop (b), only left 
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side feeders are considered in the calculation of p(Reward). During VTE events, p(Reward) is averaged 
across all four feeder locations (c). 
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Decoding at VTE events 
Entry and exit times through the T4 choice point were recorded for each pass 
using the field of view of camera 2. Orient-reorientations were noted. On instances where 
multiple orient-reorient behaviors were observed, we calculated p(Reward) for each 
event. All cells were used during decoding at VTE events. 
 
Counterfactual Representations  
Because different sets of OFC cells responded to each of the four reward-sites, it 
was possible to measure p(Reward) for a given site. As above, spatial tuning curves for 
the entire maze were defined for each cell for each loop, right and left, and then separate 
p(Reward) measures were taken from the decoded posteriors at each feeder site (Figure 
4-5). During counterfactual calculations only reward responsive cells were used for 
decoding p(Reward) (see Figure 4-7). 
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Figure 4-5 The Decoding process.  
a Any decoding algorithm consists of three parts: (1) a set of tuning curves which defines the expected 
firing as a function of the variable in question, (2) a set of spikes or firing rates (In order to prevent a 
tautology, the spikes used in (2) should not be taken from the same set used to generate tuning curves in 
(1). We accomplish this by a leave-one-out approach in which the tuning curve definition does not include 
the lap in question), and (3) the posterior probability calculated from (1) and (2). We use two independent 
decoding processes – one in which the tuning curves are defined from spatial position on the leftward loop 
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only, and the other in which the tuning curves are defined from spatial position on the rightward loop only. 
Each of these decoding processes provides us with a posterior probability of spatial position around the 
maze. It is important to note that we do not require that OFC cells be spatial in order to derive spatial 
decoding posteriors. Because rewards are only delivered at specific locations on our maze, cells which fire 
primarily in response to reward will drive our spatial decoding to those reward locations (the feeder sites). 
A cell that fires in response to any reward will drive decoding to all of the reward sites on the maze; a cell 
that only fires in response to banana-flavored pellets will drive decoding to the first-left-feeder, etc. As 
shown in Figure 4-8 we have a diversity of cells which respond to subsets of feeders. We define “reward 
decoding, p(Reward)” as the amount of posterior probability that has been spatially located to those feeder 
sites.  
 
b Calculating the counterfactual. For two cells with differentiable tuning curves, cell 1 and cell 2, we can 
use the activity of both cells to determine where on the maze the firing rate best represents the location of 
the rat. In the top panel, cell 1 prefers banana, and is more active at left feeder 1 when the animal receives 
banana flavored pellets. Cell 2 does not respond to banana flavored pellets. To calculate the decoding we 
combine information from cell 1 and cell 2 and ask where on the maze does this activity represent? If cell 1 
is very active and cell 2 inactive, combing that information increases the probability of decoding to left 
feeder 1, where the rat has received banana flavored pellets. This represents an increased probability of 
decoding to the local reward, p(Rewardsame). If cell 2 is now active and cell 1 inactive, we would expect 
that the probability of decoding to reward would now shift to right feeder 1 (fruit) where the rat just 
received fruit flavored pellets (middle panel). Again this would increase the probability of decoding to the 
local reward site, p(Rewardsame). Because both cells differentiate between feeders, we can determine the 
probability of decoding to a non-local reward as well as a local reward.  
 
If the rat is at left feeder and does not receive reward, cell 1 no longer increases its activity. Instead cell 2 
increases its activity. We again calculate the probability of decoding. Because cell 1 is inactive, we see very 
small probability of decoding to the local reward site. However, cell 2 increases its activity. As a result the 
probability of decoding to the-would-have-been rewarded site, increases (i.e. right feeder 1/fruit). To 
compare both these values, we compare the log ratio of the all the activity and the decoded probability on 
the local side versus all the activity and the decoded probability on the opposite, non-local side and ask, 
which side has a higher probability? 
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p(Rewardsame) was defined as the p(Reward) for the side on which the rat 
currently was located, while p(Rewardopposite) was defined as the p(Reward) for the other 
side. When constructing p(Rewardsame) and p(Rewardopposite) we created two training sets, 
same and opposite. Same side training sets included correct laps from the same loop that 
the rat was currently on. Opposite side training sets included correct laps from the 
opposite loop than the rat was currently on. If, for example, a rat was at right feeder 1 and 
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received reward, p(Rewardsame) would be defined from correct rightward tuning curves, 
while p(Rewardopposite) would be defined from correct leftward tuning curves. On error 
passes we compared error, non-rewarded passes to the two test sets, p(Rewardsame) and 
p(Rewardopposite). On correct passes we compared correct, rewarded passes to the two test 
sets, p(Rewardsame) and p(Rewardopposite).  
As above, these training sets were selected from correct laps, either all left correct 
or all right correct and excluded the lap that contained the feeder-pass of interest. Correct 
passes were those at which the rat arrived at the correct feeder and received reward; error 
passes were those at which the rat arrived at the wrong feeder and no reward was present. 
Decoding was stopped once the rat left the feeder site. Correct laps were matched to error 
laps by randomly selecting either the correct lap that immediately preceded the error lap 
or the correct lap that immediately followed it. Correct laps immediately following the 
start of the session and the switch were excluded from the test sets. 
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4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Behavior 
Rats effectively learned the task. During the six probe days with contingency 
switches, rats started at chance and quickly learned to choose correctly (Figure 4-6a). 
Rats maintained a high percentage of correct laps until the change in reward contingency. 
Following the contingency switch, the percentage of correct laps dropped below chance 
and gradually returned to a high percentage of correct laps (Figure 4-6b). 
Initially, as the rats learned the task, VTE was high while the rats determined the 
correct contingency. As rats learned the task and the percentage of correct laps increased, 
the amount of VTE (zIdPhi) demonstrated at the choice point decreased (Figure 4-6c). 
When rats encountered the change in contingency, VTE increased drastically and then 
decreased back to levels seen during stable, correct performance (Figure 4-6d).  
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Figure 4-6 Behavior on MT-LRA.  
a Rats performed at chance (dashed line) during the first few laps on the task. The rat had a 66% chance to 
receive food on his first lap because the first lap of an alternation session was always rewarded. As rats 
discovered the correctly rewarded contingency, their behavior stabilized and the majority of laps were 
correct (reward received). b Following the contingency switch, correct accuracy fell below chance (to the 
expected level the rat would show if it perseverated on the previous first-half-session strategy, dashed line). 
Rats were not aware of the time of the contingency switch or of the new, correct contingency. c VTE 
(zIdPhi) from the start of each session by lap. There was a significant effect of early laps on VTE (ANOVA 
laps 1-5, F = 4, P < 0.01). d VTE following the switch was significantly higher than scores prior 
(Wilcoxon, P < .01). Comparing the 5 laps pre switch to the 5 laps post switch demonstrated a significant 
interaction of VTE and lap (ANOVA F = 3, P < 0.01). 
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4.3.2 Reward responsivity at feeders 
Past neural recordings in OFC have demonstrated robust reward responses with a 
variety of specific responses 
30,299,342,356,358
. Some cells responded to different rewards 
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(Figure 4-7).Many cells demonstrated preferential activity for a reward site, some 
responded more for banana flavored pellets at Left feeder 1 (Figure 4-8a) or for fruit 
flavored pellets at Right feeder 1 (Figure 4-8b). Of the 712 cells, 506 (71%) were 
classified as reward responsive. Cellular reward response dynamics we observed are 
consistent with prior recordings in this region 
91,299,356
.  
Other data have suggested the OFC encodes value during decision processes 
227,228
. Given that an individual rat would be expected to have a preference for one food 
over the other, if the OFC cells were encoding value, we would expect all of that animal’s 
cells to prefer one food over the other. As shown in the Figure 4-7, cellular firing 
preferences within animal were equally divided between sides. This suggests that the 
reward-responses included sensory information. This interpretation is consistent with 
recent evidence that OFC represents the sensory aspects of rewards in a current state 
rather than value and is necessary during model-based decision making 
128,192,193,262,263
. 
 
Figure 4-7 Number of cells that responded to each different reward type/location.  
Many cells responded preferentially for a given reward type. Others responded for a given rewarded side, 
while some responded for certain combinations of reward sites. 
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Table 4-1 Reward combination responsivity. Each row and column represents a different feeder location. 
At each intersection point, numbers indicate how many cells responded for the different locations. If the 
row and column match, then the number reflects the number of cells for one feeder location (L1Reward x 
L1Reward, 50 cells). If the column and row intersect and are different, then the number reflects the number 
of cells that significantly responded at only those two sites (R1Reward x L1Reward, 10 cells). Certain cells 
were active for combinations: 10 cells responded to both L1 Reward and R1 Reward, while 9 cells 
responded to both R2 Reward and L2 Reward. 108 Cells responded at all reward locations. 
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Table 4-2 Explicit reward responses to individual feeders. Table 2 shows the number of cells, within rat, 
that responded explicitly to either Left feeder 1 reward (banana) or Right feeder 1 reward (fruit). 
328
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
 
 72 
 
Figure 4-8 Individual Neurons, different Rewards. Individual Neurons prefer left rewards.  
a This cell, R172-2009-07-07-TT05_5, preferred Left feeder 1 reward (banana). Very little activity was 
present at all other reward sites. Panels show rasters at each of the four feeder reward sites for each 
rewarded feeder pass (event #) with the population density overlaid in the red trace. As indicated by the 
rasters, this neuron responded significantly more to left feeder 1 (banana). The waveform shows the 
average waveform of the example neuron, because we are recording from tetrodes, waveforms have four 
components. The LRatio and Isolation Distance indicate that this neuron was well isolated from the other 
spikes in the session. b The bottom panels show a different neuron, R172-2009-07-08-TT10_7.t, which 
responded to both left feeder rewards (banana left feeder 1 and white, left feeder 2) much more strongly 
than the right feeder rewards. Panels, as in (b), show individual rasters with overlaid population spike 
densities convolved with a Gaussian at each of the four feeder sites during each rewarded feeder pass 
(event #). The waveform shows the waveform for this neuron on each channel of the tetrode. (c) A cell, 
R171-2009-05-10-TT08_1, that prefers Right feeder 1 reward. (d) R186-2009-09-14-TT06_1, which 
responded more to the right feeder rewards (fruit right feeder 1 and white, right feeder 2). 
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4.3.3 Reward representations during VTE 
Previous evidence has suggested that evaluative decision making occurs during 
orienting/re-orienting behaviors, quantified as VTE 
125,150,352
. If evaluative processes 
necessary for deliberation are occurring during VTE, and if reward expectations are being 
modified or generated during this deliberative process, we should expect to see these 
expectations reflected in OFC activity.  
Over the first 20 laps, 158 of 506 reward responsive cells demonstrated a 
significant individual firing rate correlation with VTE (Figure 4-9a,c). Of those 158 cells, 
36 were also correlated with speed (Figure 4-9e,g). Even excluding the cells correlated 
with speed, many cells continued to show a relationship between zIdPhi (VTE) and 
reward firing while the rat was at T4, indicating that speed could not explain the excess 
neural activity in reward cells during VTE.  
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As previously stated, VTE reappeared after the contingency switch. To test if 
VTE and firing rate were still correlated after the switch, we again calculated the 
individual regressions for the z-scored firing rate of each reward-responsive cell against 
zIdPhi by lap. Again, there was a strong relationship between VTE and firing rate, driven 
in large part by the first few laps post-switch, when VTE was high. Following the switch 
in reward contingency, 214 reward responsive cells displayed a significant increase in 
normalized firing rate with VTE. Of those 214 cells, only 57 were correlated with speed 
(Figure 4-9d,f,h). These correlations imply that OFC reward responsive cells increased 
their firing rates during VTE. This effect could not be explained as simple correlations 
with speed.  
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Figure 4-9 Firing rate and zIdphi relationships.  
For each reward responsive cell, the average firing rate through a pass across T4 was calculated. A total of 
506 cells responded significantly to reward. We then z-scored that firing rate distribution for each cell, 
producing a zFRate measure for each cell for each pass. Each panel shows the average zFRate across cells 
for each lap as a function of zIdPhi for that lap. Left panels used lap numbers aligned to the start of the 
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session. Right panels used lap numbers aligned to the switch in reward contingency. For many of these 
cells, so much activity was present at the reward site relative to the rest of the maze, that the zFiring rate 
was negative at all locations, even at the choice point, even when the cell fired extra spikes at the choice 
point and not elsewhere. The shift in z-scores during VTE identified that reward responsive cells increased 
their firing rate, but not to the same level as seen at the reward locations. 
 
The top panels (a,b) shows the average zFRate versus zIdPhi for all reward responsive cells (506 cells). 
The next row of panels (c,d) shows the average zFRate versus zIdPhi for all cells that had a significant 
correlation between individual firing rate and zIdPhi (158 cells aligned to start of the session, 214 cells 
aligned to contingency switch). Of the reward responsive cells correlated with zIdPhi, some cells were also 
correlated with the speed of the animal during the choice point pass. The third row of panels (e,f) shows the 
average zFRate versus zIdPhi for all cells that were also correlated with speed (36/158 cells aligned to start 
of the session, 57/214 cells aligned to contingency switch). The bottom row of panels (g,h) shows the 
average zFRate versus zIdPhi for those cells not correlated with speed (122/158 cells aligned to start of 
session, 157/214 cells aligned to contingency switch).  
 
The diagram on the right (i) depicts the total number of cells (black), the number of reward responsive cells 
(red), the number of reward responsive cells correlated with zIdPhi (blue), and finally the number of reward 
cells correlated with zIdPhi and speed in orange and the number of reward cells correlated with zIdPhi but 
not speed in purple. 
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Reward cell activity at T4 was significantly different from non-reward cells 
(Figure 4-10). Previous research has indicated that ventral striatal reward cells show a 
similar phenomenon 
351
. van der Meer and Redish  found that this increased activity 
translated into an increased decoding to reward locations under a Bayesian decoding 
analysis 
351
. In order to determine whether the increased firing in OFC in Figure 4-10 
entailed a representation of the reward, we determined the extent to which OFC 
ensembles decoded to reward locations during VTE.  
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Figure 4-10 Increased activity of reward cells at the choice point.  
Reward responsive cells showed significantly higher firing rates than non-reward responsive cells at T4 as 
well as at F1,F2 (ANOVA F = 5.3, P = 0.03; ANOVA F = 23, P < 0.01). We compared the normalized 
activity of reward responsive cells at salient maze locations by linearizing the tracking data from each 
session and assigning a set number of points between landmarks (Schmitzer-Torbert and Redish, 2004;van 
der Meer and Redish, 2009). A two-way ANOVA with lap (laps 1-10) and location on the maze (T1 to 
halfway to F1) as factors demonstrated a significant variation in firing rate across the navigation sequence 
(F = 5.6, p << 0.01). A Tukey post hoc comparison indicated that the activity at T4 was higher compared to 
other portions of the navigation sequence (T4: Mean = 0.44, Std = 0.07; Avg T1-T3: Mean = -0.08, Std = 
0.09). 
328
 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 4-10, p(Reward) increased following reorientation 
events, then decreased as the rat left the choice point and progressed towards the feeders. 
Individual reward responsive cells showed increased activity during VTE events, as 
illustrated by the sample cell in Figure 4-11a. Interestingly, p(Reward) decoding to a 
specific reward site was not seen. Instead reward representations remained general. The 
non-specific increase in p(Reward) seen following reorientation suggests that once the rat 
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has made a decision, his reward expectation 
reflects the potential for reward rather than an 
explicit reward such as banana or fruit.  
An alternative explanation for increased 
representation of reward during VTE behaviors 
could be activity related to the previous lap (which 
was often an error). Previous reports have indicated 
that signals in OFC relate to the reward on the 
previous trial 
331
. On our task VTE does increase 
during similar laps that errors do (early laps and 
again after the switch) 
30
, however there was no 
direct relationship between VTE and error trials 
(comparing VTE after errors to VTE after 
Figure 4-11 Example Activity and decoded p(Reward) during VTE events.  
a This particular reward responsive cell spiked multiple times during VTE. The 
inset shows the average waveforms of this cell for each channel of the tetrode. The 
behavior demonstrates the typical ‘head sweep’ seen during a VTE event. The red 
dots indicate neural spikes which are overlaid on top of the behavioral tracking 
data. The current lap is denoted by black dots. Reorientation is identified by the 
peak deviation in the pass, indicated by the blue arrow. On many sessions, multiple 
reorientation events occurred at the choice point. For this figure, p(Reward) was 
calculated using decoding based on all cells. p(Reward) was defined as the average 
posterior probability at each of the reward locations on the maze. Both left feeder 
and right feeder locations were included as part of the average to calculate 
p(Reward). Average p(Reward) peaked immediately after the turnaround (green) on 
the (b) first, (c) last and (d) all reorientations at the choice point. We performed a 
control by shuffling (grey trace in b, c, d) (nBoot = 500) the interspike intervals for 
each cell and recalculating the decoding using the un-shuffled tuning curves. This 
control determined that random firing would not reliably decode to reward 
locations. (Steiner and Redish 2012) 
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matched/following correct laps, Wilcoxon, p=0.1329).  
Our data suggests that following VTE, representations of reward remain general 
and nonspecific (Figure 4-12), failing to represent a given side/specific flavor. During 
VTE the rat is contemplating the possibility of reward. However, this more than likely 
reflects the possibility of reward and we cannot distinguish between the sensory aspects 
of reward or reward value during VTE. During VTE it is possible that the rat has not 
transitioned to a rewarded state and is still selecting between the two available 
representations. 
Hippocampal representations of the alternate choices do not reliably represent the 
direction the animal is facing – an animal can face to the left, but show a sweep of 
hippocampal representation to the right 
125
. OFC activity could be confused for value if it 
represented the simplest sensory aspect of the reward, food or not. Given that the decision 
on MT-LRA is to remember which side is going to be reward on a given trial (and thus 
that, although the choice is free, the reward is defined), the specific sensory aspects of 
reward may be irrelevant at the time of decision. The activity might then seem to reflect 
the value of the reward during VTE. However, once the animal has reached the reward 
and consumed it, the sensory aspects of the reward would be fully represented. 
The representations at the feeders more than likely represent the sensory aspects 
of reward rather than only the value of it. Given that an individual rat would expect to 
have a preference for one food, if the OFC cells were encoding value, we would expect 
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all of that animal’s cells to prefer one food over the other. As shown in the following 
figure, cellular firing preferences within animal were equally divided between sides. This 
suggests that the reward-responses included sensory information. This interpretation is 
consistent with recent evidence that OFC represents the sensory aspects of rewards in a 
current state rather than value and is necessary during model-based decision making 
192,193,263,335
. 
 
Figure 4-12 Decoding to specific sides during VTE.  
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The direction of the VTE did not predict which side the rat was traveling towards. Decoding to reward 
during VTE was general. 
4.3.4 Disappointment and counterfactuals in OFC 
Population responses of reward cells differentiated between laps in which rats 
received reward (correct laps) and laps in which they did not (error laps). Interestingly, 
on error laps population responses were more similar to that usually seen at the opposite 
feeder. For example, cells that responded to fruit reward receipt (Right Feeder 1), often 
responded at Left Feeder 1 during errors, when no reward was present (Figure 4-13, 
Figure 4-14, single cell example). These results led us to investigate how OFC 
representations changed during the violation of reward expectation. We determined the 
difference in p(Reward) between correct and error laps and compared decoding on the 
same side loop to the opposite side loop, that is, p(Rewardopposite) was compared to 
p(Rewardsame).  
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Figure 4-13 Population Responses during errors.  
The average spike population density was calculated for all cells that preferred Left Feeder 1 (Banana) or 
Right Feeder 1 (Fruit) rewards. (a) Left-Reward/Banana preferring cells. The blue line in the lower plot 
(correct at left feeder) is larger than the blue line in the upper plot (correct at right feeder). However, note 
that the activity of left-preferring cells is larger on error laps at the right feeder than on correct laps at the 
right feeder. (b) Right-Reward/Fruit preferring cells. Cells classified as right-reward preferring 
demonstrated increased firing at the right reward sites. The blue line in the upper plot (correct at right 
feeder) is larger than the blue line in the lower plot (correct at left feeder). However, the activity of right-
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reward preferring cells is larger on error laps at the left feeder than on correct laps at the left feeder (red 
trace, lower plot). 
328
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-14 Single cell responses during errors.  
During errors (no reward was present) this fruit preferring cell’s average activity was more similar to the 
reward responses at feeder 1 when reward was present. 
 
 
By utilizing the two different decoding sets, one for each loop, we were able to 
compare responses while rats were at the feeders during correct (reward) and error laps 
(no reward). p(Rewardsame) was stronger on correct laps than during errors (Figure 
4-15a). The shift in reward representations on error laps from 1 to 3.5 seconds seen in 
p(Rewardsame) represented the neural correlate of disappointment; local representation of 
the reward decreased when the rat finally realized that he was not going to receive 
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reward. This observation of disappointment agrees with the economic definition; 
disappointment is classified as the realization that available outcome does not match the 
expected outcome 
22,173
.  
In contrast, p(Rewardopposite) was larger on error laps, when no reward was 
present, than p(Rewardopposite) on correct laps. This increase indicates that the spiking 
activity seen during errors better matched the other, would-have-been rewarded side 
during errors (Figure 4-15b). The increase in p(Rewardopposite) during errors 
(approximately 1.25 seconds, following the shift in p(Rewardsame) during errors) matches 
the definition of the counterfactual and is consistent with observations of neural 
representations of counterfactuals in humans; where an alternative, known outcome was 
better than the received outcome 
23,56,57,172,174
.  
The shift in p(Reward) is best seen by comparing the ratio between 
p(Rewardopposite) and p(Rewardsame), which is best measured as the difference of the logs: 
log(p(Rewardopposite)) – log(p(Rewardsame)). On correct laps, the difference remains on the 
same side (i.e. p(Rewardsame) > p(Rewardopposite), which indicates a better representation 
of the side the animal is on. However, on error laps, the difference is initially located on 
the same side (i.e. p(Rewardsame) > p(Rewardopposite) ), but transitions to the opposite side 
as the rat realizes no food is forthcoming (i.e. p(Rewardopposite) > p(Rewardsame) ). 
Comparing these two changes during errors, demonstrates a sustained shift to the would-
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have-been rewarded side, the counterfactual (Figure 4-15c). Similar, sustained effects can 
be seen at the second feeder-site (Figure 4-16).  
 
Figure 4-15 Decoded p(Reward) at Feeder 1 Switches Sides during Errors – Disappointment and 
Counterfactuals.  
On correct feeder passes, reward followed approximately 1.8 seconds after an audible click (see Figure 1A 
for zone entry locations). On error passes, no reward is present and the animal does not hear the audible 
solenoid click. (a) In order to determine the presence of disappointment, we examined the difference in 
p(Reward) for the same side loop as a function of whether the choice was correct or an error. As can be 
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seen in the figure, there is a clear shift in the p(Reward) on errors (purple trace at approximately 1 to 3 
seconds), when the animal realizes that he has not heard, nor will he hear the solenoid click that he expects 
and consequently he will not be receiving food. The decrease in local reward representation at 3 seconds 
occurs while the rats are pausing at the reward site, several seconds before rats begin to leave the reward 
site. Additionally, this difference is not a result of random firing in the absence of reward; shuffling the 
interspike intervals produces a much smaller p(Reward) [shown in the gray traces]. (b) Initially 
p(Rewardopposite) on error and correct are similar, however, once the rat realizes his error and begins to 
experience disappointment, neural representations increased to the opposite would-have-been rewarded 
site. This increase in p(Reward) to the opposite would-have-been rewarded side represents the 
counterfactual signal. (c) The log ratio between the local and non-local representations of reward, 
p(Rewardsame):p(Rewardopposite), for correct feeder passes and error passes. Data was smoothed using a 500 
ms moving average. Grey lines represent the upper and lower quartiles for shuffled control, based on 
shuffling interspike intervals and re-calculating the decoding using unshuffled tuning curves. On errors, the 
log ratio of p(Reward) at feeder 1 remained local, (p(Rewardsame) > p(Rewardopposite)), following arrival at 
the feeders from 0 to ~2 seconds, then switched to a non-local representation, (p(Rewardsame) < 
p(Rewardopposite)). In contrast, on correct laps, the log ratio of p(Reward) at feeder 1 remained local for the 
duration of the animal’s pause at the reward site. 328 
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Figure 4-16 Decoded p(Reward) at Feeder 2. 
a p(Rewardsame) on correct was much higher reflecting the reward received. However, during errors 
p(Rewardsame) decreased drastically. b Initially p(Rewardopposite) on error and correct remained the same. 
However, once the rat realized he would not be receiving reward, p(Rewardopposite) on errors increased and 
remained stronger than p(Rewardopposite) on correct. The sustained increase in p(Rewardopposite) during 
errors, the would-have-been rewarded side, may reflect a planning signal. c The log ratio between the local 
and non-local representations of reward, p(Rewardsame):p(Rewardopposite), for correct feeder passes and error 
passes. Data was smoothed using a 500 ms moving average. Grey lines represent the upper and lower 
quartiles for shuffled control, based on shuffling interspike intervals and re-calculating the decoding using 
unshuffled tuning curves. On errors, the log ratio of p(Reward) at feeder 2 demonstrated a sustained non-
local response, (p(Rewardsame) < p(Rewardopposite)). This sustained response to the opposite, non-local side 
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during errors may reflect a planning signal. On correct laps, as seen in Figure 5.14c, the log ratio of 
p(Reward) at feeder 2 remained local for the duration of the animal’s pause at the reward site. 328 
 
Controls 
One potential confound is that in the absence of reward, decoding may become 
random or drop off. The increased noise (random-firing) hypothesis would predict that 
decoding would shift away from the representation of the local reward-site to become 
generally uniform across the entire maze. Similarly, the reward prediction error 
hypothesis would predict that the decoded probability would merely decrease and not 
increase on the other side. Neither of these hypotheses predicts self-consistent 
representations decoding to the opposite side reward feeder location (Figure 4-15).  
To address these potential issues, we compared all decoded locations attained 
from both correct and error laps. Our decoding algorithm provided posterior probabilities 
for all possible positions on the linearized maze. By examining the posterior probability 
at other locations, we can differentiate noise from self-consistent counterfactuals (Figure 
4-17). On correct laps, the differences were significantly positive; the neural activity was 
representative of the local reward location. This analysis replicated the results seen in 
Figure 4-15a, indicating that on rewarded laps, the decoded probability was a better 
match to the local training sets; p(Reward) matched the currently rewarded location of 
the rat. This analysis also confirmed that on error trials, the decoding better matched the 
non-local training sets; p(Reward) better represented the would-have-been rewarded 
location. On error laps, the differences were significantly negative. The neural activity 
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was representative of the alternate reward location, not a general change in representation 
of the entire maze.  
 
Figure 4-17 Decoding across space.  
By comparing the log ratio of the decoding generated using all cells and with training sets on same and 
opposite sides of the rat, we can determine the extent to which neural ensembles reflect the current reward 
location, the opposite side reward location, or other locations on the maze. Each panel of the figure shows 
the difference between decoding using tuning curves based on the current side the animal is on and 
decoding using tuning curves based on the opposite side. As the rat passes the feeder trigger and hears an 
audible click (solid black line, correct), the rat receives reward and decoding is strongest to the reward site 
where the rat actually is, as indicated by the strong red color at the correct feeder location (p(same) > 
p(opposite), a: white circle, Feeder 1; b: white circle, Feeder 2). This indicates that decoding remains local 
for the duration of the rats’ stay at the feeder and fails to represent other possible locations on the maze. 
However, when the rat chooses incorrectly, upon crossing into the zone where he would have heard the 
reward trigger (dashed black line, incorrect), neural ensembles switch and represent the would-have-been 
rewarded side, as indicated by the strong blue color at the feeder locations (p(same)<p(opposite), c: white 
circle, Feeder 1 and d: white circles Feeder 2). This indicates that neural representations during errors more 
closely resemble the activity at the would-have-been rewarded feeder. The decoding does not become 
random; instead p(Reward same) decreases, while p(Reward opposite) increases. 
328
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The representations did not become random during reward, as would be expected 
from the increased-noise/random-firing hypothesis. Shuffling interspike intervals for the 
spiking data did not reliably represent reward on the maze (grey traces, Figure 4-15 and 
Figure 4-16), indicating that the increase we see to the would-have-been rewarded side 
could not be due to an increase in random firing. Nor did p(Reward) remain local, as 
would be expected by a reward prediction error signal. These decoding results indicated 
that OFC activity was representing the local, rewarded feeder during correct laps and the 
unchosen (opposite-side) feeder during errors. 
We can differentiate disappointment from the counterfactual necessary for regret 
because we are separately measuring the amount of posterior probability assigned to each 
side independently. When the amount of posterior probability assigned to the same-side 
decreased (i.e. disappointment), it is not necessarily true that the amount of posterior 
probability assigned to the opposite-side would increase. Thus a local, same side decrease 
represents disappointment, defined economically as the violation of an expectation in the 
presence of one possible outcome 
22,173
, while an increase in the opposite-side 
representation can be interpreted as a true representation of the alternative reward (i.e. the 
counterfactual necessary for regret which has been defined as the representation of the 
alternative outcome when the received outcome does not meet expectations 
23,174
. 
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4.4 Discussion 
In his poem “Mountain Interval”, the poet Robert Frost postulated that a traveler 
faced with a decision pauses to consider possible outcomes, and then compares what is to 
what could have been 
88
. Both of these processes require the representations of 
information about potential and non-local rewards, a process that relies on OFC 
13,22,41,56,57,228,243,298,299,342
. This data reports that OFC is involved in both of these 
processes: (1) During orient-reorient behavior (previously identified as VTE), as rats 
pause to consider possible outcomes, OFC encodes expectations of reward. (2) During 
errors, OFC first encodes the disappointment (local) caused by the violated expectation 
and then transiently encodes the alternative, would-have-been-rewarded option (non-
local). 
4.4.1 Orientation and Reorientation 
During early learning, computationally expensive, action-outcome processes 
attempt to predict reward through a series of what-if scenarios 
70,125,330,350
. These 
scenarios can be evaluated without the direct execution of the action that leads to the 
outcome. During this vicarious evaluation, hippocampal ensembles represent prospective 
paths and ventral striatal ensembles indicate the presence of expected reward 
125,354
. Here, 
we report that OFC ensembles reflect the expectation of general reward after re-
orientation. The general representation of reward during VTE agrees with previous data 
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based on hippocampal representations during VTE. Hippocampal representations of the 
alternate choices did not reliably represent the direction the animal is facing – an animal 
could face to the left, but show a sweep of hippocampal representations to the right 
125
. In 
our OFC data, we did not find reliable reward decoding that differentiates outcomes 
based on the orientation of the animal.  
Other data indicates that OFC representations differentiated uncertainty on a trial 
by trial basis 
142
. It is possible that during VTE, as the rat accesses internal 
representations of a reward expectation, uncertainty about the upcoming reward 
modulates the representation of reward and contributes to VTE. Additionally, activity in 
OFC may reflect some degree of decision confidence as the rat executes the turnaround 
and proceeds to a possibly rewarded site 
142,184
. Although a more likely explanation is that 
the recording locations reported in Kepecs et al are much more lateral than the recording 
locations reported here. Rat lateral orbital cortex receives different inputs, especially 
visual input and dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex which has been strongly implicated in 
working memory, than the ventral orbital cortex, (where these data were obtained from). 
4.4.2 OFC and ventral striatum 
As shown in Figure 4-11, OFC ensembles decode to represent reward 
immediately after each reorientation during the VTE process. This suggests that OFC is 
likely to be involved in expectation following reorientation. In contrast, van der Meer and 
Redish found that ventral striatal representations of reward generally preceded 
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reorientation 
354
. The tasks were identical and these reorientation processes occurred at 
the same location on similar laps. This suggests a difference between ventral striatal and 
OFC roles in decision-making processes. 
4.4.3 OFC and reward prediction error 
Our data suggest that OFC represents potential reward expectations, and our data 
are not consistent with OFC representations of reward prediction error. With experience, 
reward prediction error decreases. However, we did not see evidence for this decrease. 
Because reward-delivery at the two feeder sites on a given return rail were always either 
both provided (correct lap) or both not provided (error lap), reward prediction error 
signals would predict no activity at the second feeder site on a given lap. As shown in 
Figure 4-8, robust reward-related activity was seen at the second feeder-site. In fact, we 
were able to identify both disappointment signals and counterfactual signals at the 
second-feeder site.  
4.4.4 OFC’s contribution to a decision 
Previous evidence from Johnson and Redish 
125
 has identified that hippocampal 
representations sweep ahead of the animal’s location. Additional evidence links normal 
OFC function to the presence of an intact hippocampus 
250
. When an animal approaches a 
decision point, hippocampal ensembles represent the possible paths. Following the spatial 
representations, ventral striatal ensembles represent the possible reward that lies at the 
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end of the represented paths. Our current data suggests that OFC represents the 
expectation of reward following the representation of reward in ventral striatum and the 
representation of potential paths in hippocampus. This implies that hippocampus likely 
contributes information regarding the paths to reward concurrently with reward/value 
information on the upcoming reward from ventral striatum. This information may be 
combined in OFC to form a state expectation, which includes the relevant sensory aspects 
of the reward, the reward type and other unique reward properties.  
On MT-LRA, because reward sites are at a fixed location, location and reward are 
confounded. However, if OFC is representing the state of the expected reward, then all 
salient features of the reward, including the contingency (side) of the reward may be 
represented. The representation of state characteristics would allow an animal to make 
decisions using model-based processes 
128,176,193,335
 see also 
70,350
. The exact timing of the 
reward representations in OFC and ventral striatum would be of much interest and could 
potentially provide useful evidence of a functional dissociation between OFC (state 
expectation) and ventral striatum (value calculation). Our data indicates that reward 
expectations peak in OFC after the turn-around point. van der Meer and Redish 
354
 found 
that the reward expectations in ventral striatum peaked before the turn-around point. 
However, it is important to note that the recordings came from different tasks and slight 
variations in the task procedures could have affected these timings. Further experiments 
recording neural ensembles from both locations simultaneously are likely to be fruitful. 
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4.4.5 Planning and counterfactuals  
There is a close relationship between the ability to plan, which must include a 
representation of the potential outcome, and counterfactuals, a representation of the 
alternative that might-have-been. Planning often occurs after violations of expectations 
and the experience of disappointment or regret. Disappointment arises when situational 
expectations are violated and these violations are beyond the scope of one’s control (Bell, 
1985).  
Disappointment (a lack of delivery of expected reward) is inherently aversive 
257
, 
however, disappointment and aversion must be computationally distinct entities because 
they show different relationships to extinction 
254,255
 – disappointment has the effect of 
extinguishing reinforced behaviors while aversion is extinguished by relief. Early 
economic studies 
22,173
 defined disappointment explicitly as reward omission. In our task, 
“disappointment” can be distinguished from the “counterfactual necessary for regret” 
because disappointment entails the recognition that an expected reward is not going to be 
delivered, while regret is the recognition that an alternative choice would have produced 
a better reward 
23,174
. This requires the evaluation of the current reward, the expectation, 
and the possible alternatives.  
Our data indicate that when the rat discovers his error at the first feeder, OFC 
representations of reward decrease at the expected reward location, implying 
disappointment, in conjunction with a distinct, transient increase in the representation of 
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the other, alternative would-have-been-rewarded option, the representation of the 
counterfactual. The strong shift during errors in p(Rewardsame) occurred while rats were 
pausing at the first feeder waiting for reward and then drastically decreased several 
seconds prior to departure for the second feeder. Therefore we find it unlikely that the 
decrease in reward representations is related to movement away from the reward site or 
increased distance from the first reward site. Following the evaluation of the 
counterfactual, the feedback from the current lap could serve to instruct choice on 
subsequent laps, which could serve as a planning signal. We find it unlikely that the 
transient representation at Feeder 1 is a planning signal because the rat still has to go to 
the second (unrewarded) feeder before proceeding to the next lap. Rats reliably stop and 
check the second feeder, even when unrewarded. The increased decoding to the would-
have-been rewarded side at the second feeder, however, may reflect a planning signal and 
represent a form of episodic future thinking 
125,235,350
. 
4.4.6 Violation of expectations 
Regret entails a comparison between the expected outcome and a better 
alternative, which implies a comparison between multiple choices 
23,41
. This means that 
regret requires a representation of a counterfactual, the better alternative. Although the 
log ratio analysis in Figure 4-15c cannot differentiate between disappointment and regret, 
the evidence in Figure 4-15a,b does differentiate, indicating that the decoding during 
errors is to the opposite reward location rather than a general diminishment in decoding 
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quality. This implies that the transient representation includes disappointment (local) and 
the counterfactual (non-local).  
The decrease seen in the representations of the local side reflects the absence of 
reward, a disappointing outcome. This is followed by a transient representation of the 
known alternatives, an increase in the decoding to the opposite side, and the comparison 
of what could have been to what was; the counterfactual and the experiencing of regret. 
Interestingly, the evidence that OFC is required for the generation of a reward prediction 
error in the ventral tegmental area, may imply that disappointment and regret drive the 
formation of the reward prediction error elsewhere 
309,335
. In human subjects during 
fictive learning, OFC activity increased when subjects were considering the possible 
outcomes of their actions in different conditions 
204,319
. Following this hypothesis, 
reversal learning could be considered to be a form of ‘learning from one’s regret’. Both 
humans and animals with OFC lesions are impaired on reversal tasks 
13,75,301
. 
Additionally, human subjects with OFC lesions do not exhibit the negative emotional 
arousal associated with the experience of regret 
41,56
. Regret and disappointment could 
contribute to the maintenance of reward expectations in OFC for a situation or a given 
model based representation 
128,176,192,193
. 
In humans, value representations of alternative outcomes (counterfactuals) 
activate OFC 
56,57
. The timing of these counterfactual representations agrees with 
experiences of regret and is correlated with fMRI BOLD activation in OFC and anterior 
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hippocampus among other structures 
56,57,243
. Which leads to the question: are rats 
capable of experiencing regret? Regret requires the comparison between an actual 
outcome and a counterfactual outcome that would have been the result of an unchosen 
action 
23,41,56,57
. There may be some evidence of causal reasoning in rats, though this 
evidence is contentious 
28
. On our task, when a rat chose incorrectly and arrived at non-
rewarded feeder sites, neural ensembles in OFC representing reward switched to 
represent reward on the opposite, rejected side, implying that rats can at least represent 
the counterfactual necessary for regret.  
4.4.7 Conclusion 
Are rodents capable of experiencing regret? There is building evidence that they 
are capable of causal thought. Causal thought contributes to the counterfactual. If 
humans, primates, and now rats are capable of calculating the counterfactual, then it is 
possible that they can use the counterfactual signal to calculate regret, as defined in the 
economics literature. With the advances in technology and the reliability of ensemble 
decoding techniques, it is now possible to measure, on an ensemble level, what the 
neurons are representing. By using this technique we can measure what reward the 
neurons in OFC are representing and use this information to determine what the rat is 
‘thinking about’.  
These techniques have been successfully used in the past and have demonstrated 
remarkable accuracy when considering a rat’s future path, the covert expectation of 
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reward, or the counterfactual. With the added behavior accuracy of the definition of VTE, 
we can determine if the rat is performing VTE behavior and if that occurrence coincides 
with the representation of the counterfactual. However, MT-LRA was not designed to test 
multiple reward representations. Other studies relied on a variety of menu items to 
determine the reward response dynamics in OFC. As a result in order to successfully 
determine what is being represented in OFC during counterfactuals and VTE, we need to 
be able to compare the neural signals to multiple different reward signals, essentially 
asking, ‘What flavor am I thinking about? What do I prefer?’.  
Human studies have termed this the revealed preference, what is the cost of a 
menu item and how much does a subject prefer that item over another? These menu items 
are subject to framing effects and can vary across days. However, during a single session 
the framing effect is usually assumed to be consistent which allows for a comparison of 
goods.  
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5. From counterfactuals to regret 
5.1 Necessity of regret to decision making 
Economic definitions of regret rely on the value of the outcome (in prospect 
theory, expected utility and in regret theory 
22,23,58,97,171,174,203,206,252,285
. However, when 
considering the effects of regret, most human subjects report that the action leading up to 
the negative outcome generated more regret than the actual outcome 
95,156,157
. Recent 
neurophysiology indicates that regret is strongest following an incorrect choice and the 
reveal of a better alternative 
56,57
. However, due to the close proximity of the decision to 
the reveal, subjects may have been expressing more regret over the actions that lead to 
the outcomes rather than the less than optimal outcomes. If subjects did in fact experience 
more regret over their actions, these results would be consistent with psychological 
measures of regret, bridging the gap between neurophysiology and psychology. However, 
this does not address the discrepancy seen in economics; previous definitions of regret 
have placed emphasis on the outcome rather than on the process of the arriving at the 
outcome.  
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This difference between the economic definition of regret and psychology 
definition of regret stems from a reliance on economics to first define the economics of 
the decision and further fit human behavior to the model derived. Psychological models 
of regret often fail to describe their findings in terms of replicable decisions models. 
Instead they allude to equations and principle generated by the economists and offer no 
translation to what has been postulated instead relying on vague descriptions on human 
behavior. This massive divide between fields has contributed many inadequate and 
incorrect models of regret.  
Building from the early descriptions of expected utility value, psychologists 
described regret as a minimax function that followed loosely with formulations of 
expected utility; an agent selects an option in a given state that if incorrect minimizes the 
amount of regret. The overall loss of the option is defined as the difference between the 
best possible payoff and the actual payoff, the smaller this value, the smaller the potential 
regret
289
. When regret is minimized the income (I) is maximized.  
                                         
This representation of regret has several issues. This methodology assumes that 
the actor determines the world to be always in the worst possible state 
289
. In addition, the 
minimax representation ignores any probabilistic representations common to expected 
utility and prospect theory 
190
. Humans generally do not use minimax regret to modify 
decisions 
102
.  
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Instead humans rely on probabilistic outcomes and try to anticipate the perceived 
cost/benefit of a decision 
97,130,131,203,205,252,253,355
. Under this framework, the anticipation 
of regret can reduce the perceived benefit of a decision, thus increasing the cost of the 
action that leads to the outcome. Regret modifies the probabilistic representation outcome 
and its associated value as well as assigning a cost to the action performed to acquire an 
outcome; the higher the perceived anticipated regret, the lower the value of the outcome. 
In retrospective decisions, regret serves an update function in the presence of more than 
one potential action/outcome, a regret function compares the perceived action/value to 
the alternative action/value 
23,174
. When regret is high, the expected/value of the 
alternative is higher than the performed action/outcome. 
5.2 Neural basis for regret 
The role of OFC in regret was first identified by Camille et al
41
. They measured 
the ability of OFC lesioned human subjects to express regret, both the negative emotions 
associated with regret, as well as the subsequent behavioral changes measured through 
skin conductivity responses 
41
. When subjects with OFC lesions selected a deal that 
resulted in a less than desired outcome to the alternative deal, they did not self report 
regret or exhibit any behavioral response to regret. In contrast control subjects under the 
same circumstances reported regret and exhibited increased skin conductivity indicative 
of a negative emotional response.   
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Subjects were asked to choose between two spinners, each of which represented a 
different distribution of reward probabilities. Once subjects selected a spinner the 
outcome of the selected spinner was revealed. Two conditions controlled for the effect of 
feedback in the experience of regret. Under the partial feedback condition, subjects were 
not shown the result of the not-selected spinner. Under the complete feedback subjects 
were shown the results of the other spinner. Following the presentation of results, 
subjects were asked to rate their experience in terms of sadness and happiness. During 
these reports skin conductivity was recorded as well.  
When considering regret, the two conditions represent disappointment (partial 
feedback) and potential regret (complete feedback). In the partial feedback condition a 
loss would be disappointing; however, without an alternative to compare that loss (in 
value) to, according to the formal economic definition of regret, ψ[v(x)-v(y)], regret could 
not be represented. In contrast, in the complete feedback condition, with two values 
presented, if the value of the non-selected option was greater than the value of the 
selected option, subjects could be expected to experience regret. 
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Figure 5-1 Measuring regret in humans.  
Both OFC lesion and control subjects selected a gamble. Each spinner had a different probability of reward. 
In the partial feedback condition only the selected gambles arrow and outcome were displayed. In the 
complete feedback condition, both selected and unselected gambles showed the outcome. In the follow set 
for partial and complete feedback, subjects were instructed that the computer would choose a gamble. (used 
with permission 
41,56
) 
 
Subjects with OFC lesions failed to report any negative experience with the 
complete feedback condition (Figure 5-1) indicating that they did not experience regret and 
when faced with future, risky gambles, did not choose the option with the least amount of 
risk (avoiding potential regret). In contrast, control subjects reported a strong negative 
emotional response to loss when instead they could have gained (Figure 5-2). On further 
trials control subjects would select the less risky of the two options to minimize their 
future potential regret. These results illustrated that not only did OFC play a role in the 
formulation and expression of regret, lesions to OFC eliminated any form of anticipated 
regret.  
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A later study used fMRI and demonstrated that mOFC activation was strongly 
correlated to the experience of regret 
56
. In addition, hippocampus and anterior cingulate 
cortex activation also showed correlations with the experience of regret. Other structures 
such as ventral striatum were correlated with value but not the experience or the strength 
of regret representations. mOFC representations also distinguished between mere 
disappointment (attenuated responses) and regret representations. Following a 
disappointing outcome, fMRI increases in OFC were much smaller when compared to an 
outcome that induced regret. These results are also consistent with the role of the OFC in 
regret modulation and the formulation of expected outcomes. 
 
 
Figure 5-2 Activity in the OFC increased following regret (loss rather than a gain) in the complete 
information condition.  
In the partial information condition, activity in OFC did not significantly change between a gain or a loss. 
(used with permission
41
) 
 
When considering OFC’s role in the formulation of regret, it is worth noting that 
the formulation of regret need not be a complex process. The formulation of regret can be 
achieved by matching the differences in action-outcomes 
111,112
. Regret matching is the 
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process of changing a previous strategy to acquire the previously missed outcome. This 
methodology seeks to maximize the expected value and minimize regret: “I chose A 
previously, A was much worse than B, so next time I will choose B”. By computing the 
counterfactual the overall value of the missed outcome is compared and the future action 
is modified to achieve a greater overall value.  
A recent experimental result in primate neurophysiology shows that neurons 
respond to both the hypothetical and the actual reward. Abe and Lee showed that 
following a loss during a rock, paper, scissors, game, neurons in the OFC represented the 
previous, hypothetical option (counterfactual) as well as the actual outcome and the 
current location of the stimulus on the screen 
1
. In addition, recent work identified neural 
representations of the counterfactual in rodent OFC 
328
, see chapter 4).  
When better alternatives were known to be available, human subjects reported 
feeling regret 
41
. When human subjects reported feeling regret, neural activity increased 
in OFC 
56
. This realization that reward would have been received had an alternative 
action been taken can be defined as the counterfactual 
41,56
.  
5.3 Exclusivity of regret 
New models of OFC function include the actions as well as the values. This 
indicates that OFC not only represents the value but other aspects as well, such as 
identity, the possible actions required, and the necessary alternatives: all are parts of the 
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representation. The implication of these results means that OFC represents the outcome 
as the combined action/value pairing, indicating that during regret, representations of the 
alternative outcome would be strongest following initiation of the action that leads to the 
expected outcome.  
By defining regret in terms of the observable action/outcome we introduce an 
interesting question; is regret exclusive to humans? If regret serves to modify future 
behavior, then it is advantageous to survival. One can reasonably expect that other 
animals can experience regret or possess a mental module capable of causal reasoning 
276,337
; if two options are available and the selected option is lesser valued, then regret 
(according to the definition) can and should be experienced. The only limitation in the 
assignment of regret is the reluctance to classify regret as something more ubiquitous 
than just a human emotion. Even human causal reasoning can be thought to have existed 
first in animals 
195,244
. There is building evidence that both rats and non-human primates 
represent the counterfactual 
1,28,115,328
 and are capable of retrospective and prospective 
evaluation 
8,76,77,87,350,381
. Other animal models such as the New Caledonian crow are 
capable of causal learning and possess the potential for counterfactual reasoning 
336
. 
Because the representation of the counterfactual is necessary for regret, it is possible that 
other animals are capable of representing regret according to the economic definition and 
the effect regret has been shown to have on future behavior. 
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To measure regret in rats, the experiment performed in Chapter 4 would require 
multiple choices 
23,41,174
, rather than just one or the other. This would make it possible to 
differentiate regret and disappointment by comparing the outcomes across multiple 
conditions, where some errors are the fault of the rat and others are the fault of the world. 
The analyses in figure 5-15 lacked the ability to measure multiple choices. To measure 
regret in rats, humans or non-human primates would require that the subject have 
choices, and that the choices have known outcomes each with a specific preference.  
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6. Neurophysiological representations of regret in rats  
6.1 Summary 
Disappointment entails the recognition that one did not get the value one 
expected. In contrast, regret entails the recognition that an alternate (counterfactual) 
action would have produced a more valued outcome. Thus, the key to identifying regret is 
the representation of that counterfactual option in situations in which a mistake has been 
made.  
In humans, the orbitofrontal cortex is active during expressions of regret, and 
humans with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex do not express regret. In rats and non-
human primates, both the orbitofrontal cortex and the ventral striatum have been 
implicated in decision-making, particularly in representations of expectations of reward. 
In order to examine representations of regretful situations, we recorded neural ensembles 
from orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum in rats encountering a spatial sequence of 
wait/skip choices for delayed delivery of different food flavors. This task revealed 
individual preferences for flavor, allowing the identification of value and cost. Rats 
occasionally skipped low-cost choices and then encountered a high-cost choice. This 
 109 
 
sequence economically defines a potential regret-inducing instance. In these situations, 
when rats looked backward towards the lost option, the cells within the orbitofrontal 
cortex and ventral striatum represented that missed action, rats were more likely to wait 
for the long delay, and rats rushed through eating the food after that delay. That these 
situations drove rats to modify their behavior suggests that regret-like processes modify 
decision-making in non-human mammals. 
6.2 Introduction  
Regret is a universal human paradigm 
23,41,57,95,158
. The experience of regret modifies 
future actions 23,57,174. However, the experience of regret in other mammals has never been 
identified; it is not known whether non-human mammals are capable of experiencing regret. 
Although non-human animals cannot verbally express regret, one can create regret-inducing 
situations and ask whether those regret-inducing situations influence neurophysiological 
representations or behavior: Do non-human animals demonstrate the neural correlates of 
regret in potential regret-inducing situations? 
When evaluating the experience of regret, it is important to differentiate regret from 
disappointment 22,23,173,175. Disappointment is the realization that a realized outcome is worse 
than expected 22,173,175; regret is the realization that the worse than expected outcome is due to 
one’s own mistaken action 41,57,95,156. Disappointment can be differentiated from regret 
through differences in the recognition of alternatives 
22,41,162,174
. Regret can be defined as 
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the recognition that the option taken resulted in a worse outcome than an alternative 
option/action would have. The revaluation of the previous choice in context of the current 
choice is the economic foundation of regret 
23,174
.  
Humans with damage to the orbitofrontal cortex do not express regret 
41
, and 
fMRI experiments reveal activity in the orbitofrontal cortex during regret 
56,57
. In rats and 
non-human primates, the orbitofrontal cortex has been implicated in decision-making, 
particularly in the role of expectations of future reward and the complex calculations of 
inferred reward 
128,193,228,297,333,342,363,369
. Orbitofrontal cortical neurons represent the 
chosen value of an expected future reward 
1,228,331
, and an intact orbitofrontal cortex is 
critical for reversal learning 
85,301
 (however recent evidence suggests that OFC may have 
a more specialized role and is not necessary for reversal learning at least in primates 
282
). 
Orbitofrontal cortex has been hypothesized to be critical for learning and decision-
making 
128,162,163,192,193,259,302,309
, particularly in the evaluation of expected outcomes 
228,328
.  
The ventral striatum has also been implicated in evaluation of outcomes 
60,121,216,245,266,354
, particularly in evaluation during the process of decision making 
159,192,193,309,316,354. Neural recordings from ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex in rats 
have found representations of reward, value and prediction of expected value in both 
structures 
239,297,328,334,335,354
. In the rat, lesion studies suggest orbitofrontal cortex is 
necessary for recognition of reward-related changes that require inference, such as flavor 
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and kind, while ventral striatum is necessary for recognition of any changes that affect 
value 
128,192,193,309
. In rats deliberating at choice points, ventral striatal reward 
representations are transiently active before and during the reorientation process 
354
, but 
orbitofrontal cortex reward representations are only active after the reorientation process 
is complete 
328
.  
We developed a neuroeconomic spatial decision-making task for rats (Restaurant 
Row) in which the rat encounters a serial sequence of take/skip choices. The Restaurant 
Row task consisted of a large inner loop, approximately one meter in diameter with four 
spokes proceeding out from the inner loop (Figure 6-1a). The zone’s entries were 
separated by ninety degrees and each one led to a potential reward location 
approximately half a meter from the entry point on the central, circular track. Each zone 
supplied a different flavor of food (banana, cherry, chocolate, and unflavored). Flavor 
locations remained constant throughout the experiment. Rats were trained to run around 
the loop, making stay/skip decisions as they passed each spoke. 
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Figure 6-1 Restaurant Row and revealed preferences in rats. 
a, The Restaurant Row task consisted of a central ring with four connected spokes leading to individual 
food flavors. Rats ran around the ring, encountering the four invisible zones (square boxes) sequentially. 
Color reflects flavor: magenta=cherry, yellow=banana, black= nonflavored/plain, brown=chocolate. b-e, 
Rats typically waited through short delays but skipped long delays. Each panel shows the stay/go decisions 
for all encounters of a single rat running a single session (R210-2011-02-02). A small vertical jitter has 
been added for display purposes. Thresholds were fit as described in Methods. f-i, Each rat demonstrated a 
different revealed preference that was consistent within rat across all sessions, but differed between rats. 
Thresholds were fit for each flavor for each session. Each panel shows the mean fit threshold for a given 
rat, with standard error shown over sessions
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As the rats proceeded around the track, the rat’s position was tracked from LEDs 
on the head via a camera in the ceiling. A spatial zone was defined for each spoke that 
included the complete spoke and a portion of the inner loop and aligned with the inner 
loop such that a rat could not miss a zone by running past it (boxes in Figure 6-1a). Upon 
entering each zone, rats encountered different offers of delays. Zone entries were defined 
entirely by the detected position of the rat’s head and were not explicitly marked on the 
track. On entry into a zone, a tone sounded, such that pitch of the tone indicated the delay 
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that the rat had to wait in order to receive reward (higher pitch = longer delay). As long 
as the rat stayed within the zone, the delay counted down, with each subsequent second 
indicated by a lower pitch tone. If the rat left the zone, the countdown stopped, no sound 
was played, and the offer rescinded – the rat’s only option was to proceed on to the next 
spoke and the next zone.  
The delays were selected pseudo-randomly from a uniform distribution ranging 
from 1-30s (for two rats) or 1-45s (for two rats). The delays were independently selected, 
so the delay offered at each zone encounter was independent of other zones for that lap. 
When making a decision to stay or skip at a given zone (when offered a given delay), the 
only information the rat had was the flavor of the food offered (because flavor locations 
remained constant throughout the experiment), the delay it would have to wait (because 
delay was signaled by pitch of the auditory cue), and the probability distribution of any 
future offers (because offers were drawn from a uniform distribution of 1-30s or 1-45s). 
Rats were run for one 60 minute session per day. This time-limit meant that rats 
had a “time-budget” of 60 minutes to spend foraging for food. Because the session was 
time-limited, the decision to stay or skip a zone was not independent of the other zones. 
Waiting at one zone was time that could have been spent at another zone. An 
economically-maximizing rat should distribute its time between the offers, waiting for 
valuable offers, but skipping expensive offers. Assuming that an animal likes some 
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flavors more than others, the value of an offer should depend on the delay offered and the 
animal's preferences.  
An important consideration is to control for the possibility that rats were waiting 
for a specific cue before leaving the zone. The fact that rats either stayed through the 
entire delay or left after a very stable 3 seconds implies that rats were not waiting for a 
specific delay cue, but were making economic decisions based on the immediate delay 
offered.  
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6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Animals 
Four Fisher Brown Norway rats aged 10–12 months at the start of behavior were 
used in this experiment.  Rats were maintained at above 80% of their free-feeding weight. 
All experiments followed approved NIH guidelines and were approved by the 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee at the University of Minnesota. 
6.3.2 Experimental Design 
The Restaurant Row task consisted of a central ring (approximately three feet in 
diameter) and four spokes leading off of that ring (Figure 6-1). At the end of each spoke, 
a feeder (MedAssociates, St. Albans VT) dispensed two 45mg food pellets of a given 
flavor (banana, cherry, chocolate, and unflavored[plain], Research Diets, New 
Brunswick, NJ). A given flavor remained at a constant spoke through the entire 
experiment. A trigger zone was defined so as to include a spoke and the portion of the 
ring nearby. Zones were primed in a sequential manner so that the rat ran in one direction 
around the loop. When the rat entered a primed zone, a tone sounded indicating the delay 
the rat would have to wait in that zone to receive food. Offered delays ranged from 
1 second (identified by a 750Hz tone) to 45 seconds (12kHz). As long as the rat remained 
in the active zone, a tone sounded each second, decreasing in pitch (counting down by 
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250Hz increments). If the rat left the zone, the tones stopped, and the next zone in the 
sequence was primed.  
In practice, rats waiting out a delay would proceed down the spoke and wait near 
the feeder; rats skipping a zone would proceed directly on to the next trigger zone. Each 
rat ran one 60 minute session each day. Zones were defined as a box around each reward 
location and extended onto the circular inner portion of the maze such that a rat was 
required to pass through a zone. Each reward arm extended approximately 22 inches 
away from the circular portion of the track. During training, rats were allowed to run the 
task in any manner they saw fit. However, rewards were only available if they traveled 
through the zones sequentially, Zone1 to Zone2, to Zone3, to Zone4. If a rat were to 
travel backwards the rat would have had to complete approximately three laps in order to 
prime the previous zone. Rats quickly learned that this behavior was not viable. Within 
seven days, rats learned to travel in only one direction and to pass through each zone 
sequentially. 
 
Rats were initially handled and accustomed to the different flavors as described 
previously 
328
. Rats were shaped to the task in three stages. In the first stage, all offers 
were 1 second. Once rats ran 30 laps/session consistently, they progressed to the second 
stage. In the second stage, each offer was randomly chosen from 1 to 10 seconds 
(uniform distribution, independent between encounters). Again, once rats ran 30 
laps/session consistently, they progressed to the third stage, in which they faced the full 
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Restaurant Row task with offers selected between 1 and 30 seconds (uniform 
distribution). Two rats often waited out the full 30 seconds at some locations, so delays 
were increased for those rats to range from 1 to 45 seconds. 
Once rats were completing at least 50 laps/session on the full Restaurant Row 
task, they were implanted with hyperdrives targeting the ventral striatum and 
orbitofrontal cortex. Rats were then re-introduced to the task until running well. Each 
day, rats were allowed to run for 60 minutes and often completed upwards of 70 entries 
per zone. Rats received all of their food on the track each day.  
6.3.3 Control task (4x20).  
In order to confirm the economic nature of the Restaurant Row paradigm, two rats 
ran an additional task after completing all recordings. In this modified version, each rat 
ran one session per day which consisted of four blocks of 20 minutes/block. In each 
block, one reward site provided three food pellets (of its corresponding flavor), while the 
other three reward sites provided one food pellet (of their corresponding flavors). Delays 
ranged from 1 to 45 seconds (uniform distribution). Each of the four sites were the “3-
pellet” site for one of the four blocks each day. Which site was improved in which block 
was pseudo-randomly varied across days. Rats were removed to rest on a nearby flower 
pot for 60 seconds between each block. 
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6.3.4 Surgery 
 Rats were implanted with a dual bundle 12 tetrode + 2 reference hyperdrive 
aimed at ventral striatum (6 tetrodes + 1 reference, M/L +1.8mm, A/P +1.9mm) and 
orbitofrontal cortex (6 tetrodes + 1 reference, M/L +2.5mm, A/P +3.5mm) (Figure 
6-2)
328
. For two rats, the two targets were left vStr and left OFC, while for two rats the 
two targets were right vStr and right OFC. Following surgery, tetrodes were turned daily 
until they reached vStr and OFC. Upon acquisition of large neural ensembles and a return 
to stable behavior on the maze, each rat ran a minimum of 10 recording days. Data 
reported here came from a total of 47 sessions distributed evenly over the four rats, R210: 
12 sessions, R222: 12 sessions, R231: 13 sessions, R234: 10 sessions 
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Figure 6-2 Representative recording locations from OFC and vStr. 
 
Rat Number OFC (number of cells) Vstr (number of cells) 
R210 225 243 
R222 329 43 
R231 336 112 
R234 235 61 
Table 6-1 Number of cells recorded from each structure separated by rat. 
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6.3.5 Data Analysis 
Behavior 
Threshold calculation. At every encounter with a reward zone, the rat could wait 
through the delay or skip it and proceed to the next zone. Skips occurred throughout the 
duration of each session (Figure 6-3). If the rat chose to skip, it tended to do so quickly 
(Figure 6-4). As can be seen in Figure 6-1, rats tended to wait for short delays and skip 
long delays, as expected. In order to determine the threshold, we defined stays as 1 and 
skips as 0 and fit Sigmoid functions of stay/skip as a function of delay using a least 
squares fit (Matlab, MathWorks, Natick MA). The threshold for “above/below” 
calculations was defined as the mid-point of the Sigmoid. We determined a threshold for 
each rat for each session for each zone. All preference data was measured during the task 
and each rat demonstrated a different preference indicated by the amount of time that rat 
was willing to wait for reward. 
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Figure 6-3 Percentage of stays and skips on a given lap across all sessions and zones.  
The number of stays that occurred on a given lap did not significantly vary across all sessions. On each lap 
the number of passes the rat stayed was compared across all sessions for that lap. For example, on lap 1, 
50% of all passes resulted in a stay. 
327
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VTE. Vicarious trial and error (VTE) was measured as the integrated absolute 
angular change in the orientation of motion of the head, as measured by sequences of 
head position samples (Papale , 2012; Steiner and Redish, 2012). This measure was 
calculated through a short algorithm sequence: first the position of the head <x,y> was 
sampled at 60 Hz via the Cheetah Neuralynx system. Change in head position <dx,dy> 
was calculated using the Janabi-Sharifi(Janabi-Sharifi , 2000) algorithm. Orientation of 
motion <phi>, was calculated as the arc-tangent of <dx,dy>. Change in orientation of 
motion was <dphi> was calculated by applying the Janabi-Sharifi algorithm to <phi>. 
VTE was measured as the sum of the absolute value of <dphi> over first two seconds of 
time after entering a zone <IdPhi>. 
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Figure 6-4 Behavioral Summary.  
First Row. In order to determine whether rats were waiting for a specific tone before leaving, we measured 
the time spent at each zone encounter over all rats, over all sessions. Graph shows number of seconds spent 
waiting as a function of the delay offer. A rat waiting out the entire delay would add into the x=y line; a rat 
leaving immediately would add into a cluster near the 0 duration waited. As can be seen in the histogram, 
rats tended to wait through the entire delay or leave after 3 seconds.  
Vicarious trial and error (VTE). When rats encounter certain decisions, they sometimes pause and turn back 
and forth between the multiple options, as if deliberating between them(Muenzinger and Gentry, 1931; 
Muenzinger, 1938). In humans and other primates, a similar process can be seen in saccade-fixate-saccade 
(SFS) sequences (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Krajbich , 2010). Previous studies have found these 
VTE events to primarily occur during flexible (non-automated) behaviors (Muenzinger and Gentry, 1931; 
Johnson and Redish, 2007; van der Meer and Redish, 2009; Papale , 2012; Steiner and Redish, 2012), 
however, previous studies have not examined the relationship between VTE and decision difficulty.  
  
Rats running the task showed three clear behaviors on encountering a new spoke – they sometimes just ran 
down the spoke to sample the food-delivery site, they sometimes skipped the spoke, and they sometimes 
paused and expressed VTE at the decision-point. As noted above, sampling tended to occur when the 
delays were below the threshold that rat had for that flavor, while skips tended to occur when the delays 
were above threshold. We quantified VTE through a measure of the integrated angular velocity of the head 
position of the animal(Steiner and Redish, 2012). We found that VTE tended to occur at the threshold, 
decreasing dramatically when the delay was less than threshold (generally a sample), but also decreasing 
when the delay was greater than threshold (generally a skip), (blue dotted lines, bottom plot; Linear 
Regression, R
2
=0.95, P < 0.001 pre threshold; R
2
=0.76, P<0.001 post threshold). 
Several behaviors were typical when rats encountered a delay upon entering a zone.  
 
Second Row. If the delay was above threshold, rats would often skip the zone relatively quickly (decrease 
in speed at 1 second followed by increasing speed after 2 seconds), spending little time in the current zone. 
VTE on these passes was typically low. Third Row. If rats decided to stay, they generally proceeded to the 
reward site and waited until the tone counted down and reward was delivered (as indicated by the very low 
average speed for the remainder of the time in zone). Again, on these passes VTE was typically quite low. 
Fourth Row. On close to threshold delays, rats demonstrated stronger VTE. If rats chose to sample the 
reward, they would proceed towards the feeder and wait through the remainder of the delay (early 
fluctuation in speed indicates high VTE, followed by decrease, near 0 cm/s speed indicates the rat has 
arrived at the feeder location where he remains until reward is received). Fifth Row. Again if rats 
encountered a close to threshold delay and this time chose to skip the reward, VTE remained high. Rats 
remained stationary for a longer period of time (from 1 to 6 seconds) before finally locomoting and leaving 
the current zone for the next zone. 
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Identifying regret-inducing and control situations. On entry into a given 
(“current”) zone, we defined the situation as regret-inducing if it met the following three 
conditions: (1) The offer at the previous zone was a delay < threshold for that previous 
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zone for that rat for that session. (2) The rat skipped the previous offer. (3) The offer at 
the current zone was a delay > threshold for that current zone for that rat for that session. 
The first control was defined using the same criteria as for regret-inducing 
situations, but that (2) The rat took the previous offer. This control situation keeps the 
sequence of offers the same, but controls for the rat’s agency/choice. 
The second control was defined using the same criteria as for regret-inducing 
situations, but that (1) The offer at the previous zone was a delay > threshold for that 
previous zone for that rat for that session. This control situation keeps the rat’s choices 
the same, but makes the choice to skip the previous option the correct one. 
 
Condition Offer at previous Rat’s action Offer at current 
Regret-inducing Delay < threshold SKIP Delay > threshold 
Control 1 Delay < threshold STAY Delay > threshold 
Control 2 Delay > threshold SKIP Delay > threshold 
Rejoice Delay < threshold SKIP Delay < threshold 
Rejoice Delay > threshold SKIP Delay < threshold 
Regret Delay > threshold STAY Delay < threshold 
Table 6-2 Summary of the different conditions. 
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Curvature. In order to identify the pause-and-look behavior, we measured the 
curvature of the path of the animal’s head, and identified the point of maximum curvature 
and the direction of that point. Curvature was measured through the following 
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algorithmic sequence: the position of the head was measured at 60 Hz from the LEDs on 
the headstage via the camera in the ceiling, giving <x,y> coordinates, velocity <dx,dy> 
was calculated using the Janabi-Sharifi algorithm acceleration <ddx, ddy> was calculated 
by applying the Janabi-Sharifi algorithm 
124
 to <dx,dy>. Finally, the curvature at each 
moment was defined as
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Neurophysiology 
Cells were recorded on a 64 Channel Analog Cheetah-160 Recording system 
(Neuralynx, Bozeman MT) and sorted offline in MClust 3.5 (Redish, current software 
available at http://redishlab.neuroscience.umn.edu/). For all sessions, the position of the 
rat was tracked via overhead camera viewing colored LEDs on the headstage.  
 
Reward Responsiveness. We are interested in determining how a cell modulates 
its activity during reward delivery. To measure this quantitatively, we compared the 
firing rate of the cell in the 3s after reward-delivery to 500 randomly-selected 3s intervals 
throughout the task. If a cell’s firing rate is different (whether increased or decreased) 
during reward delivery, then it carries information about reward delivery. We can 
measure this change by determining if the activity during the 3s after reward-delivery 
was significantly different than the bootstrap. Because these distributions were not 
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Normal, we used a Wilcoxon to calculate significance. Responsiveness to each reward 
site was calculated independently. 
 
Bayesian decoding. Any decoding algorithm consists of three parts: (1) a training 
set of tuning curves which defines the expected firing as a function of the variable in 
question, (2) a test set of spikes or firing rates, and (3) the posterior probability calculated 
from (1) and (2). In this manuscript, we used two decoding processes – one in which the 
tuning curves were defined as the neural activity in the 3 seconds after reward-delivery at 
the four reward-locations [p(Reward)], and one in which the tuning curves were defined 
as the neural activity in the 3 seconds after initial cue-delivery (zone entry) [p(Zone)].  
When calculating p(Zone), time after reward delivery was not included. This was only 
important for delays < 3 seconds. 
p(Reward). Throughout the paper we refer to this measure as “p(Reward)”, 
however, mathematically, it is p(reward|spikes). Assuming a uniform distribution of 
reward priors, this equation is: 
                  
                     
         
 
 
We defined the training set of p(spikes|reward) as the firing rate during the 3s 
after a given reward delivery (e.g. p(spikes|banana), etc.). In order to provide a control 
for unrelated activity, we also included a fifth condition in our calculation, defined as 
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average firing rate during times the animal was not in any countdown zone. Thus, the 
training set consisted of five expected firing rates: firing rate after reward-receipt (1) at 
banana, (2) at cherry, (3) at chocolate, and (4) at nonflavored, plus a fifth control of 
expected firing rate (5) on the rest of the maze. Because of the inclusion of the fifth 
(average firing rate when not at reward) condition, the normalization factor is 0.20. 
p(Zone). Throughout this chapter we refer to this measure as “p(Zone)”, however, 
mathematically, it is p(zone|spikes). Assuming a uniform distribution of reward priors, 
this equation is: 
                
                   
         
 
 
We defined the training set of p(spikes|zone) as the firing rate during the 3s after 
entry into a given trigger zone (e.g. p(spikes|banana-zone), etc.). In order to provide a 
control for unrelated activity, we also included a fifth condition in our calculation, 
defined as average firing rate during times the animal was not in any trigger zone. Thus, 
the training set consisted of five expected firing rates: firing rate after zone-entry (1) at 
banana, (2) at cherry, (3) at chocolate, and (4) at nonflavored, plus a fifth control of 
expected firing rate (5) on the rest of the maze. Because of the inclusion of the fifth 
(average firing rate when not in any trigger zone) condition, the normalization factor is 
0.20. 
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Calculating representations of previous, current, next opposite. In order to 
average across passes between different rewards, we first calculated the posterior 
probability for a given question (e.g. p(Reward) or p(Zone)) separately for each restaurant 
or zone. We then rotated the results based on the zone/reward in question to define a 
current zone/reward (the one the rat is currently encountering), a previous zone/reward 
(the one the rat had just left), a next zone/reward (the one the rat would encounter next), 
and an opposite zone/reward. By utilizing ensemble decoding, we can effectively ask 
what recorded neurons are representing with the highest probability, taking into account 
both increases and decreases in firing rate.  
6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Revealed preferences  
Four rats were trained on the Restaurant Row task (Figure 6-1). All four rats 
showed similar behaviors in that they were likely to wait through the delay for delays less 
than a threshold, but unlikely to wait through the delay for delays greater than a 
threshold. Skips and stays were evenly distributed throughout each session (Figure 6-3). 
When rats skipped an option, they left within the first ~5 seconds, independent of delay 
(Figure 6-4). The threshold between waiting and skipping tended to be different for the 
different flavors for a given rat (Figure 6-1b-e). These thresholds were consistent within 
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rat, but differed between rats (Figure 6-1f-i) and where consistent across zones across 
days (Figure 6-5, Figure 6-6, Figure 6-7, Figure 6-8, Figure 6-9, R210: ANOVA p = 0.99 
R222: ANOVA p = 0.02 (no sessions significant after multiple comparisons) R231: 
ANOVA p = 0.14 R234: ANOVA p = 0.0005 (only session 2 was significantly different 
than sessions 5-10 but not different than 1, 3 and 4, otherwise, no other sessions were 
significantly different), indicating an underlying revealed preference for each flavor of 
food that did not change across a given session (Figure 6-5). There were no differences in 
reward handling between delays, rats generally waited 20-25 seconds after consuming 
reward before leaving for the next zone (Figure 6-10). 
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Figure 6-5 Comparison of thresholds within session by rat.  
Thresholds were consistent within each session. If we compared the thresholds from the first half to the 
second half, no thresholds were significantly different between the first and second half of each session. 
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Figure 6-6 R210 Thresholds across session by zone.  
Black lines indicate the overall average threshold across all sessions. Red lines indicate the standard error 
of the mean. Thresholds for each zone, for each rat were consistent across days. 
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Figure 6-7 R222 Threshold by session. 
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Figure 6-8 R231 Threshold by session. 
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Figure 6-9 R234 Threshold by session. 
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Figure 6-10 Average time spent in zone after consuming reward.  
After consuming food, rats typically took 20-30 seconds before leaving the zone. This did not change as a 
function of the delay the rat had waited before receiving the food. 
327
 
 
 
In order to directly test whether the rats were making economic decisions 
(comparing value and cost), after completing the primary Restaurant Row experiment, we 
ran two of the rats on a variant of the task in which one reward site provided three times 
as much food as the other three sites. In this control task, rats were run on four 20-minute 
blocks, so that each site could be the large reward site for one block. (The order of which 
reward site provided excess reward was varied pseudo-randomly. Rats were removed to a 
nearby resting location for one minute between blocks.) Rats were consistently willing to 
wait longer for more food (Figure 6-11). All results reported here except for Figure 6-11 
are from the primary Restaurant Row experiment. 
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Figure 6-11 Economic behavior on RRow.  
To determine if the rats took value into account when making decisions to stay or go (a key tenet in 
neuroeconomics 
130,205,228
), two of the rats (R231 and R234) underwent an additional variation of the 
Restaurant Row task following completion on the unmodified version of the task. In this modified version, 
sessions consisted of four 20 minute blocks. During each 20 minute block, one reward flavor site dispensed 
three food pellets rather than two pellets (i.e. 3x 45 mg), while the other sites only dispensed one food 
pellet (i.e. 1x 45 mg). The four blocks allowed us to have each site be the “more valuable” site for one 
block. The order was randomly determined each day. Delays were randomly selected, as in the original 
task. Each 20 minute block was followed by a one minute rest, during which time the rat was removed to a 
small flower pot to the side. Each rat ran one complete session of four blocks per day.  
 
Rats were willing to wait longer for the larger reward. This manipulation indicates that increasing the 
reward size increased the time rats were willing to wait, which implies that increasing reward size had more 
value, and that the rats were behaving economically.  
 
There is no reason to expect the increase in the amount of time willing to wait for larger rewards to be 
linear. Subjective value depends upon the internally generated function for each reward (humans 
150,169
, rats 
2,26,372
, primates
228
). Because rats, like humans, have preferences, we would expect that different rewards 
would have different values. However, the only real way to measure a value is by the choices that occur 
within a given context. By measuring the revealed preferences for each flavor we are essentially 
determining the subjective value of each reward.  
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Rats discount hyperbolically 
187,188,231. In addition, it has been shown that rats’ preference saturates as the 
number of pellets increases. Thus, the amount of time a rat will wait for 4 pellets is not twice the time a rat 
will wait for 2 pellets 
231
. We would not expect the value of 3 pellets to be exactly equal to 3x the value of 1 
pellet. The amount a rat will consume at a given moment is not a linear relationship to the amount of food 
available. The time a rat would be willing to wait for 3 pellets should be greater than the time it would be 
willing to wait for 1 pellet. The time spent waiting for 3 pellets was larger than the average time spent 
waiting for 1 pellet. 
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6.4.2 Reward responses 
We recorded 951 neurons from orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and 633 neurons from 
ventral striatum (vStr). Neurons were identified as reward-responsive if their activity 
during the 3s following reward delivery was significantly different (P<0.05, Wilcoxon) 
than a bootstrapped (n=500) sample of activity during 3s windows taken randomly across 
the entire session 
328,354
. 81% of OFC neurons responded to reward; 86% of vStr neurons 
responded to reward. Responses in both OFC and vStr often differentiated between the 
four reward sites. (see Figure 6-12, Figure 6-13). 
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Figure 6-12 OFC cells reliably represent different flavors of reward.  
Example reward-related cells from orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). Each super-panel (a,b,c,d) shows firing 
from a single cell. Within each super-panel, each subpanel shows that cell’s response around the time of 
reward-delivery. The color of the trace indicates flavor (yellow = banana; black = plain/non-flavored; 
magenta = cherry; brown = chocolate) and the trace itself indicates the response (in spikes/sec) of the cell. 
Small dots indicate spikes on individual reward-delivery events. Trace shows average firing over all events, 
smoothed with a Gaussian window (sigma=50 ms). As can be seen in these examples, different cells 
responded differently (but reliably) to the different flavor-reward-sites. 
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Figure 6-13 vStr cells reliably represent different reward flavors.  
Example reward-related cells from ventral striatum (vStr). Display as in Figure 6-12.  
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Because responses differentiated between rewards, a decoding algorithm applied 
to these neural ensembles should be able to distinguish between the reward sites. We 
used a Bayesian decoding algorithm 
380
 with a training set defined by the neuronal firing 
rate in the 3s following delivery of reward (which we used to calculate p(spikes|Reward)) 
or a training set defined by the neuronal firing rate in the 3s following entry into a zone 
(which we used to calculate p(spikes|Zone)). In order to provide a control for unrelated 
activity, we also included a fifth condition in our calculation, defined as average neuronal 
firing rate during times the animal was not in any countdown zone. Thus, the training set 
consisted of five expected firing rates: firing rate after reward-receipt or zone entry (1) at 
banana, (2) at cherry, (3) at chocolate, and (4) at nonflavored, plus a fifth control of 
expected firing rate (5) on the rest of the maze. From this training set, Bayesian decoding 
uses the population firing rate at a given time to derive the posterior probability of the 
representation p(Reward|spikes) or p(Zone|spikes). For simplicity, we will refer to these 
two measures as p(Reward) and p(Zone). 
In order to pool data from all four sites, we categorized and rotated each reward 
site based on the current position of the animal. This gave us four sites that progressed in 
a serial manner – the previous site, the current site, the next site, and the opposite site ( 
Figure 6-14c). All analyses were based on this categorization. Throughout all 
analyses, we used a leave-one-out approach so that the encounter being decoded was not 
included in the definition of the training set. Both OFC ( 
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Figure 6-14a) and vStr ( 
Figure 6-14b) were capable of reliably distinguishing between the current reward 
site (see also Figure 6-15) and the other sites. Shuffling the interspike intervals of the 
cells removed all of these effects. p(Reward) and p(Zone) calculated from shuffled data 
were consistently at 0.14 (Figure 6-16). As shown in Figure 6-17 and  
Figure 6-14, the ensemble reliably differentiated entries into the different zones as 
well as the different rewards. As shown in  
Figure 6-14d,e during normal behavior, the ensemble reliably represented the 
current zone on entry into it and the current reward on receipt of it.  
Zone entry responses. Previous research has suggested that in simple association 
tasks in which cues predict reward, both OFC and vStr cells respond to cues predictive of 
reward 
128,193,266,269,297,299,313
. Both OFC and vStr neural ensembles distinguished the 
different zones both at the time of reward ( 
Figure 6-14a-c) and at the time of entering the zone/tone sounding ( 
Figure 6-14d-f). (for single cell differentiation see Figure 6-12 and Figure 6-13, 
decoding differentiation Figure 6-15and Figure 6-17). These representations were related; 
thus, neural activity in OFC and vStr also predicted the reward type of the current zone 
during zone enter/cue onset ( 
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Figure 6-14g-i, Figure 6-18a,b). Shuffling the interspike intervals eliminated these 
effects (Figure 6-18c,d).  
 
 
 
Figure 6-14 Ensembles in OFC and vStr representing the current reward and the current zone.  
a-b, p(Reward) @ Reward, Defining the training set for decoding as firing at reward delivery and the test 
set as firing at each moment surrounding reward-delivery, the neural ensemble decoded the current reward 
reliably (distribution of current reward was determined to be significantly different, empirical cumulative 
distribution function, alpha = 0.05). p(Reward) is the posterior probability indicating representation of a 
 142 
 
given reward flavor as calculated from a Bayesian decoding operation as per Methods. c, Cartoon 
indicating that the training set is the set of reward types, and the test set is firing when the rat receives 
reward. (A leave-one-out approach prevented the tautology.) d-e, p(Zone) @ Zone, Defining the training set 
for decoding as neuronal firing at zone entry and the test set as neuronal firing at each moment surrounding 
zone-entry, the neural ensemble decoded the current zone reliably. p(Zone) is the posterior probability 
indicating representation of a given zone entry as calculated from a Bayesian decoding operation as per 
Methods. f, Cartoon indicating that the training set is zone entry, and the test set is neuronal firing when the 
rat enters the zone, triggering the cue that signals the delay. (A leave-one-out approach prevented the 
tautology.) g-h, p(Reward) @ Zone, Defining the training set for decoding as neuronal firing at reward-
delivery and the test set as neuronal firing at each moment surrounding zone entry, the neural ensemble at 
time of zone entry decoded the current reward type reliably. i, Cartoon indicating that the training set is the 
reward flavor, and the test set is neuronal firing when the rat enters the zone, triggering the cue. 
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Figure 6-15 OFC and vStr ensembles track the current reward.  
Orbitofrontal (OFC) and ventral striatal (vStr) neural ensembles accurately tracked the rewarded flavor 
during reward receipt as identified previously 
356-358
. Panels show the confusion matrices of the decoding. 
We calculated p(Reward) @ Reward for each flavor, using a leave-one-out approach to avoid the tautology. 
Note that, as per Methods, the decoding returns five values, for each of the four flavors plus the fifth 
“other” condition. a,b, The strong increase in the identity comparison implies separate representations of 
each flavor-reward-site. c,d, Shuffling the interspike intervals of the cells removes these representations. 
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Figure 6-16 Shuffles.  
To determine the chance level for the representations of  
p(Reward) @ Reward, p(Zone) @ Zone, and p(Reward) @ Zone, we shuffled the interspike intervals. 
Shuffling the interspike intervals preserves the firing characteristics of the cells but disrupts their alignment 
to temporal events. Shuffling the interspike intervals for all cells during reward receipt produced a chance 
level of ~0.14 for all conditions. 
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Figure 6-17 OFC and vStr ensembles track the current zone/cue.  
Orbitofrontal (OFC) and ventral striatal (vStr) neural ensembles differentiated cue signals at entry into the 
different zones. As in Figure 5.11, panels show the confusion matrices of the decoding. We calculated 
p(Zone) @ Zone for each zone, using a leave-one-out approach to avoid the tautology. Note that, as per 
Methods, the decoding returns five values, for each of the four flavors plus the fifth “other” condition. a,b, 
The strong increase in the identity comparison implies separate representations of each trigger zone. c,d, 
Shuffling the interspike intervals of the cells removes these representations. 
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Figure 6-18 OFC and vStr ensembles accurately track which reward is paired with each zone.  
To determine the relationship between cues and reward-related activity, we calculated the confusion 
matrices for the decoding for p(Reward) @ Zone. a,b, The strong increase in the identity comparison 
implies matched representations between each reward and zone. c,d, Shuffling the interspike intervals of 
the cells removes these representations. 
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Both OFC and vStr responded strongly under conditions in which the animal 
determined the cost to be worth staying (e.g. when the delay was below threshold, Figure 
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6-19a,b). In contrast, neither structure represented expectations of reward under 
conditions in which the animal determined the cost to not be worth it (i.e. skips, when 
delay was above threshold, Figure 6-19c,d). This suggests that these structures were 
indicating expected value, and predicting future actions.  
To directly test this hypothesis, we compared reward-related decoding when the 
rat encountered a delay near threshold (threshold +/-2 s) and either stayed to sample the 
feeder (Figure 6-20a,b) or skipped to proceed to the next reward option (Figure 6-20c,d). 
When the animal stayed (waiting for a reward), both OFC and vStr increased their 
representations of the current reward at the time of zone entry. In contrast, when the 
animal skipped the current reward, neither OFC nor vStr reliably represented the current 
reward/zone. Shuffling the interspike intervals of the cells removed these effects (Figure 
6-21). 
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Figure 6-19 Representations of expected reward as a function of delay and threshold.  
In order to determine whether orbitofrontal (OFC) and ventral striatal (vStr) signals predicted behavior at 
time of zone-entry, we measured p(Reward) @ Zone for all offers above and below the threshold for a 
given rat for a given flavor-reward-site. a,b, Low-cost offers in which the rat waited through the delay. c,d, 
High-cost offers in which the rat skipped out and did not wait through the full delay.  a,c, OFC. b,d, vStr. e, 
Cartoon indicating that this decoding operation was based on a training set at the reward, but a test-set at 
zone-entry. 
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Figure 6-20 Stay and skip decoding around threshold.  
In order to determine whether orbitofrontal (OFC) and ventral striatal (vStr) signals predicted behavior 
differentially for similar offers, we measured p(Reward) @ Zone, for all offers near threshold (delay within 
2 seconds above or below threshold). a,b, Encounters in which the rat waited through the delay. c,d, 
Encounters in which the rat skipped out and did not wait through the full delay.  a,c, OFC. b,d, vStr. Note 
that the current reward was better represented during stays than the other zones (a,b). In contrast, during 
skips, the current zone was not better represented; instead, the representations of the next zone began to 
appear after 2-3 seconds (c,d). 
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Figure 6-21 Shuffles around threshold.  
Analysis of the same data shown in Figure 5.16, but with interspike intervals shuffled. Shuffling ISIs 
removed all effects. 
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6.4.3 Regret 
Regret entails the recognition that one has made a mistake, that an alternate action 
would have been a better option to take 
23,174
. As noted above, a regret-inducing situation 
requires two properties be satisfied: (1) the undesirable outcome should be a result of the 
agent’s previous action, and (2) following the selection of an option, the outcome/value 
of all options needs to be known, including the outcome/value of the unselected options. 
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Our task and behavior satisfies these conditions. Because the rats were time-limited on 
the Restaurant Row task, encountering a high-cost delay after not waiting through a low-
cost delay means that skipping the low-cost delay was a particularly expensive missed 
opportunity.  
In the Restaurant Row task, a rat would sometimes skip an offer that was less than 
that rat’s threshold for that flavor on that day and then encounter an offer at the 
subsequent site that was greater than that rat’s threshold for that flavor on that day. 
Because the delay is a cost and value is matched (by definition) at threshold, this 
sequence is one in which the rat skipped a low-cost offer, only to find itself faced with a 
high-cost offer. As discussed above, this sequence should induce regret 
23,174
. From the 
economic and psychology literature, we can identify these sequences as potential “regret 
inducing” situations. We can compare these conditions to control conditions which we 
would expect to provide disappointment rather than regret. 
The previous literature suggests that during regret, there should be manifest 
changes in the animal’s behavior and neurophysiology that reflect a recognition of the 
missed opportunity, as well as subsequent behavior taking choices that one might not 
have made normally. Theoretically, the key to regret is a representation of the action not 
taken 
38,95,156-158
. This implies that there should be representations of the previous choice 
during the regret-inducing situations, particularly in contrast to control conditions that are 
“merely disappointing”.  
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Thus, we define a regret-inducing situation as one in which (1) the rat skipped a 
low-cost/high-value reward (delay less than measured threshold for that flavor for that 
day), and then (2) the rat encountered a high-cost/low-value reward (delay greater than 
measured threshold for that flavor for that day). In this situation, the rat has made an 
economic mistake: if it had taken a different action (waited for that previous reward), it 
would have had a more valuable session. For consistency, we will refer to the opportunity 
in (1) as the previous zone/previous reward and the opportunity in (2) as the current 
zone/current reward. 
As noted above, one needs to differentiate regret-inducing sequences from 
sequences that are merely disappointing. By definition, a disappointing sequence occurs 
when one encounters a situation that is worse than expected, but not due to one’s own 
agency. There are two controls that need to be taken into account, a control for the 
sequence of offers (control 1), and a control for the animal’s actions (control 2).  
To control for the sequence of offers, we took sequences in which the rat 
encountered the same sequence of offers, but took (stayed for) the first offer. This 
matched control should only induce disappointment (worse than expected, but not due to 
the fault of the rat) 
22,173
. Control 1 differs from the regret-inducing situation only in that 
the rat took the previous offer rather than skipping it. In summary, control 1 was defined 
as situations in which the delay at the previous zone was below threshold and the rat 
waited for reward, followed by an encounter at the current zone such that delay was 
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above threshold. In this situation, the rat did not make a mistake (as it waited for reward 
at the previous zone); the delay at the current zone was merely worse than the rat was 
willing to wait for, making the rat (presumably) disappointed. Control 1 controls for the 
sequence observed by the rat. 
To control for the rat’s actions, we took sequences in which the offer at the 
previous zone was greater than threshold (and skipped), and, again, the rat encountered a 
higher-than-threshold offer at the current zone. In this second control condition, the rat 
skipped the previous offer, but that was the “correct” action to take, as the previous offer 
was above threshold. This second control condition should also induce disappointment 
because the rat has encountered two high-cost offers in a row. But this second control 
condition should not induce regret, because the rat’s actions were consistent with its 
revealed preferences. Control 2 differs from the regret-inducing situation only in that the 
delay at the previous offer was above rather than below threshold. In summary, control 2 
was defined as situations in which the delay at the previous zone was above threshold, 
followed by an encounter at the current zone such that delay was above threshold. In this 
situation, the rat did not make a mistake (since it skipped a high-cost delay at the 
previous zone), but the delay at the current zone was worse than the rat was willing to 
wait for, making the rat (presumably) disappointed. Control 2 controls for the reward 
sequence seen by the rat.  
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Potential regret and control instances were found within each session by 
comparing the delays at each of the zones to the threshold of that zone for that rat for that 
day. Regret instances and control instances were evenly distributed throughout each 
session across all rats. The distribution of the high-cost offers at the current zone did not 
differ between the potential regret-inducing sequences and matched controls (Figure 
6-22). 
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Figure 6-22 Match samples during regret and controls. 
It is important to ensure that the current delay offers made in the matched control encounters had the same 
distribution as the regret-inducing instances. Graph shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of 
the “current” offers included in each condition. The distributions were closely matched, indicating that any 
results seen (e.g. Figure 6-26) were not a result of differences between the current offers.  a, Regret-
inducing vs. control 1. b, Regret-inducing vs. control 2. The thin lines on the empirical distribution plot 
represent the 95% confidence intervals (alpha = 0.05). Mann Whitney U tests indicated that the distribution 
of delays were not significantly different (vs control 1, a, p=0.20; vs control 2, b, p=0.11). 
327
  
 
 156 
 
Behaviorally, rats paused and looked backwards towards the previous option upon 
encountering a potentially regret-inducing sequence, but did not do so in either control 
condition (Figure 6-23). We identified pause-and-look events as points of high curvature 
and derived an orientation (see 6.3 Methods). During potential regret-inducing 
sequences, rats were more likely to look backwards towards the previous option than 
during either of the matched control conditions (P<0.05, Watsons Circular U Test). In the 
first control condition (where the rat took a good offer and then encountered a bad offer), 
the rat tended to look towards the current zone, but then skip it and go on to the next 
zone. In the second control condition (where the rat encountered two bad offers in a row), 
the rat tended to look towards the next zone. Thus, there was a behavioral difference, 
implying that the rats recognized these three situations differently. 
 
Figure 6-23 Behavioral responses in regret-inducing and control situations.  
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All passes were rotated so as to align on entry into a “current” zone. Orientation was measured using the 
curvature measure as per 7.3.5 Methods. a-c, examples of approaches for each of the three conditions: 
regret-inducing, control 1 (same sequence, took previous option), and control 2 (two long delays in a row). 
a, In a regret-inducing example, when the animal entered the zone, he paused and looked backwards 
towards the previous zone. b, In a control 1 example, the animal looked towards the current reward spoke, 
but proceeded on to the next zone. c, In a control 2 example, the animal looked towards the next zone, but 
turned back towards the current reward. d-f, Summary statistics. The first re-orientation event was 
measured as per 7.3.5 Methods. Grey traces show all pausing re-orientations over all instances within that 
condition. Heavy line shows vector average within each 120 degree arc. d, In the regret-inducing 
conditions, rats tended to orient towards the previous zone or current spoke. e, In the control 1 conditions, 
rats tended to orient only towards the current spoke. f, In the control 2 conditions, rats tended to orient 
towards the next zone. The distributions in d, e, and f, were significantly different from each other 
(Watson’s Circular U, see text). 327 
 
During potential regret instances individual reward-responsive neurons in OFC 
and vStr showed firing patterns more consistent with the previous reward than the current 
one (Figure 6-24). Neural activity peaked immediately following the start of the look 
back towards the previously skipped, low cost reward. In order to quantify these changes 
in representation during regret-inducing situations and disappointment-inducing controls, 
we examined the population dynamics using a Bayesian decoding algorithm. Population 
decoding analyses offer insight into the dynamics of neural population. Ensemble activity 
more accurately represents the dynamics of the entire population much compared to that 
of a single cell. In order to determine the neural population representation during these 
situations, we utilized all the cells and measured the Bayesian representations of 
p(Reward) and p(Zone). 
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Figure 6-24 Single reward cells in OFC and vStr during regret-inducing situations.  
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Top Panel. OFC Example Cell during regret-inducing situation. Grey dots represent individual spikes. 
Solid colored lines indicate Gaussian smoothed activity, sigma = 50ms. Black = nonflavored pellets, pink = 
cherry flavored, yellow = banana flavored, brown = chocolate flavored. Black dots in the center panel 
represent behavioral samples during this particular instance. Red dots show spikes aligned to behavior. The 
rat traveled in a counterclockwise direction. The maze has been aligned so that the current zone is 
represented by the bottom right zone. This particular cell responded most to entry into the cherry reward 
zone, and little to the banana reward zone. When the rat skipped a low cost cherry zone opportunity and 
encountered a high cost banana zone opportunity, the rat looked back towards the previous reward; and the 
activity of the cell approximated that of the cherry-zone-entry response. Bottom Panel. Display same as 
top panel, vStr example cell during a regret-inducing situation, this time from the chocolate-reward zone to 
the cherry-reward zone. 
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While our first inclination was to look for representations of the missed reward, 
human subjects self-report that they regret actions taken or not, more than they do missed 
outcomes 
95,156-158
. We did find a weak representation of the missed reward (not 
significant, see Figure 6-25).  
 
Figure 6-25 Decoding to previous reward during regret.  
Under normal conditions the current reward is accurately represented. However during regret instances the 
current reward representations are drastically decreased. Instead neuronal firing rates more accurately 
represent the missed previous reward. The average decoding for the previous p(Reward) was different from 
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the shuffled data (ANOVA p << 0.001 for VStr and p << 0.001). However, p(Reward) for OFC was not 
significant (ANOVA p = 0.046) after controlling for multiple comparisons. p(Reward) for vStr was not 
significant after controlling for multiple comparisons. 
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However, we found that there were strong representations of the previous 
decision-point (p(Zone)) that were significantly different than all four other zones (Figure 
6-26a-c, outside the 95% confidence interval as determined by empirical cumulative 
distribution function). This differentiation of the previous zone was not observed in either 
control condition. In the first control (same sequence), both OFC and vStr demonstrated 
increased representations of the next zone (Figure 6-26d-f). By definition, these control 
instances were high-cost encounters with the current reward site (e.g. above threshold), 
and, thus the rats were likely to skip them. In the second control condition (two bad 
offers), the representation of both the current and previous zones increased and were 
different than the representations of other rewards (Figure 6-26g-i). However, this 
response was markedly different from that seen during potential regret instances as the 
increase in representation of the previous zone could not be differentiated from the 
increase in representation of the current zone. Shuffling interspike intervals eliminated all 
of these effects. Other more positive situations (rejecting a low-cost previous offer and 
then encountering a low-cost offer, or rejecting a high-cost offer and then encountering a 
low-cost offer) both led to strong representations of the current zone (Figure 6-27). Other 
more positive situations (rejecting a low-cost previous offer and then encountering a low-
cost offer, or rejecting a high-cost offer and then encountering a low-cost offer) both led 
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to strong representations of the current zone (Figure 6-27). In addition, when rats stayed 
for an above threshold delay, but then encountered a below threshold delay (which could 
be described as a potential regret inducing condition) we again found increased 
representations of the previous zone (Figure 6-28). The representations of the previous 
zone in this condition (Stay at Delay A > Threshold A to Delay B < Threshold B) were 
smaller when compared to the previously-described regret-inducing condition. 
 
Figure 6-26 Neural representations in OFC and vStr represent the previous zone during behavioral 
regret instances.  
In regret-inducing conditions, the p(Zone) representation of the previous encounter was high after zone 
entry into the current zone for both OFC (a) and vStr (b). Green traces show decoding using shuffled ISIs. 
Decoding to the previous zone was significantly different from all other conditions, even after controlling 
for multiple comparisons (ANOVA, OFC: p << 0.001; vStr: p << 0.001, distribution significantly different 
as determined by empirical cumulative distribution function, alpha = 0.05). Panel c shows a cartoon of the 
conditions being decoded – the rat has skipped the previous offer, even though the delay was less than 
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threshold for that restaurant, and has now encountered a delay greater than threshold for the current 
restaurant. In the control 1 condition, p(Zone) representation of the current zone increased until the rat 
heard the cue indicating a long delay, at which time, the representation changed to reflect the next zone. In 
control 1, p(Zone) representations to the current and next zones were significantly different from the other 
zones (ANOVA, vStr: p << 0.001; OFC: p << 0.001 ), although they were not different from each other 
after controlling for multiple comparisons (ANOVA, vStr: p = 0.074, OFC: p = 0.619). (d: OFC; e: vStr; f: 
Cartoon indicating condition.) In the control 2 condition, p(Zone) representation of both the current and 
previous zones was increased when the rat heard the cue indicating a long delay (compared to other zones 
ANOVA, OFC: p << 0.001 , vStr p << 0.001). (g: OFC; h: vStr; i: Cartoon indicating condition.) Decoding 
to the current and previous zones in control 2 were not significantly different from each other (ANOVA, 
OFC: p = 0.509; vStr: p = 0.268). 
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Figure 6-27 Additional conditions, in which the rat finds a below-threshold opportunity after 
skipping a previous one.  
a-c If the first reward offer was lower than threshold and rats skipped then encountered a second reward 
lower than threshold, both OFC and vStr represent the current reward more accurately. This increase occurs 
immediately after the rat enters into the current, primed zone. This result is consistent with data indicating 
that OFC represents a given reward when a state paired with that reward has been entered. Prior to entry 
into the current zone, there is no difference in the representations. d-f When the rats skipped a high-
threshold, high cost delay and encountered a low cost delay, both OFC and vStr ensembles accurately 
represented the current reward. 
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Figure 6-28 Alternative regret situation.  
Posterior Probability p(Zone) when the rat stayed for a delay @ A > threshold @ A and encounters a delay 
@ B < threshold B. Both OFC and vStr ensembles increased their decoding to the previous reward. 
Representations of the previous zone were significant (OFC: ANOVA, p << 0.05; vStr: ANOVA, p << 
0.05). However, these representations were not as strong compared to instances when the rat skipped a 
delay A < threshold @ A and encountered a delay B > threshold B. 
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Thus, the rats showed different behaviors and different neurophysiological 
representations during regret-inducing situations, both of which reflected the information 
processing we would expect to see during regret. As noted above, an important role of 
regret in decision-making is that it changes subsequent decisions 
5,6,367
. Consistent with 
this hypothesis, we found that rats were more likely to stay at the high cost option in a 
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regret-inducing situation than under either control condition (vs. first control condition, 
p=0.01; vs. second control condition p=0.06, Wilcoxon, Figure 6-29a). In addition, rats 
spent less time after eating the food before proceeding on to the next reward site 
following regret-inducing situations compared to non-regret conditions. (Typical 
handling time mean = 25.3 seconds, regret handling time mean = 15.1 seconds, control 
handling times are distributed as typical handling times, Figure 6-29b). After waiting for 
food through a long-delay in a regret-inducing situation, rats rushed through eating and 
quickly went on to their next encounter. 
 
Figure 6-29 Behavioral changes following potential regret instances.  
a, Comparing the proportion of stays to skips during each condition revealed that rats were significantly 
more willing to wait for reward following regret inducing instances compared to a control 1 instances 
(Wilcoxon, p = 0.01) or control 2 instances (Wilcoxon, p = 0.06). b, Rats spent less time consuming reward 
during regret than during non-regret instances. 
327
 
 
 
The hypothesis that the neural representation of the previous zone reflects some 
information processing related to regret implies that there should be a relationship 
between that representation of the previous zone and the animal’s subsequent actions. 
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The hypothesis predicts that a stronger representation of the previous zone would lead to 
an increased likelihood of taking the high-cost (current) offer.  To determine if there was 
a relationship between a rat’s willingness to take the high-cost offer and the 
neurophysiological representations, we compared the ratio of representations of the 
previous and the current zones and categorized these representations by stay/skip 
decisions at the current zone. As shown in Figure 6-30, this ratio was increased when the 
animal decided to stay, but only within the regret-inducing situations. The ratio was 
unrelated to the decision to stay in the two control conditions. In regret-inducing 
situations, animals were more willing to stay on trials in which they showed an increased 
representation of the previous zone relative to the current zone. 
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Figure 6-30 Behavioral and neurophysiological correspondences during regret.  
In order to determine whether the representations of previous reward were different when the rat chose to 
stay at the high-delay (high-cost) current zone, we measured the ratio between the p(Zone) representation 
of the previous zone against the p(Zone) representation of the current zone from 0 to 3 seconds following 
zone entry for all conditions in the event that the rat skipped or stayed. Each panel shows a box plot of the 
distribution of                                ratios divided between stays and skips. a, 
                               ratios from OFC ensembles during regret-inducing conditions. b, 
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                               ratios from vStr ensembles during regret-inducing conditions. d, e, 
during control 1 conditions. f, g, during control 2 conditions. Following regret inducing instances, when 
rats were more willing to wait for reward, p(Zoneprevious) was greater than p(Zonecurrent). 
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6.5 Discussion 
Regret is the introspective recognition that a previously chosen action led to a less 
desirable outcome than an alternative action would have. The two keys to identifying 
regret are value and agency. The Restaurant Row task, in which rats made economic 
(value-related, cost-dependent) decisions allowed us to identify potentially regret-
inducing situations. First, the Restaurant Row task was an economic task, in which rats 
revealed preferences just as human and non-human primates do 
109,150,228
. Second, 
because the rats had a limited time-budget, encountering a bad (above-threshold) offer 
after skipping a good (below-threshold) offer, meant that the rat had missed an 
opportunity. By standard economic and psychological definitions, this sequence should 
induce regret 
23,156,174
. We were able to identify two matched sets of controls that should 
induce disappointment but not regret: (1) situations in which the rat encountered a similar 
sequence of offers but took the previous low-cost option, and (2) situations in which the 
rat encountered two above-threshold offers and skipped the previous high-cost option.  
Our data indicate that behavioral and neurophysiological differences between the 
potential regret-inducing situations and the controls were consistent with a hypothesis 
that the rats were expressing something akin to human regret. During the regret-inducing 
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situation, rats looked backwards towards the previous (missed) goal, and the orbitofrontal 
cortex and ventral striatum were more likely to represent that previous goal. After it, rats 
were more likely to wait out the (current) high-cost offer, and rushed through handling 
their reward when they did. Interestingly, we found that the neurophysiological 
representations of counterfactual information in the regret-inducing situation were more 
strongly related to the missed action (activity when the action was taken, measured by 
p(Zone)) than to the missed outcome (activity when the reward was received, measured 
by p(Reward)). This is consistent with data that humans express more regret about the 
actions taken (or not taken) than about the missed outcomes 
95,156-158
. 
The Restaurant Row task had three features that made it particularly well suited to 
the identification of regret. First, it is an economic task on which rats reveal preferences. 
Second, the inclusion of four “restaurants” allowed us to differentiate a general 
representation of other rewards from a specific representation of the mistaken choice. We 
found a clear and significant representation of the previous (lost) zone, not the next or 
opposite zones. Third, the Restaurant Row task separates the choice of waiting (staying) 
or going (skipping) from reward-receipt. This separation allowed us to differentiate the 
regret-induced representation of the previous (lost) reward (a small effect) from the 
regret-induced representation of the previous (mistaken) action (a large effect). Regret is 
more about the things you did or did not do than about the rewards you lost 
38,55,58,156-158
.  
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Prior evidence indicates that rats can combine information to form an expectation 
of a novel reward (imagining a particular outcome), and a role for both OFC 
33,333,369
 and 
vStr (if a model in the evaluation steps of the task exists) in this process 
128,192,193
. Our 
data indicates that violation of an expectation initiates a retrospective comparison 
(regretting a missed opportunity). As with the prospective calculation of expectation, this 
retrospective calculation of expectation influences future behavior – rats are more willing 
to wait for reward following a regret instance. These two processes, the act of imagining 
future outcomes and the process of regretting previous, poor choices, are both necessary 
to modify future decisions to maximize reward.  
Previous studies have identified potential representations of the counterfactual 
could-have-been-chosen option in rats 
328
, monkeys 
1
, and humans 
56
. In humans, 
representations of the value of the alternative outcome activate OFC 
56,57
. Abe and Lee 
1
 
found that there were representations of an untaken alternate option in monkey OFC on a 
cued-decision-making task, in which the alternate option that should have been taken was 
cued to the monkey after the incorrect decision.  
The connectivity between OFC and vStr remains highly controversial with some 
evidence pointing to connectivity 
43,45,221
 and other analyses suggesting a lack of 
connectivity 
183,291
. The anatomical and functional mechanisms through which the OFC 
and vStr derive their representations of regret-related counterfactual information remains 
 170 
 
unknown. In addition the analyses used here lack the temporal resolution necessary to 
determine any interactions between structures.  
The Restaurant Row task introduced here allowed economic measures to identify 
potential regret-inducing situations, in which the rat made a decision that placed it in a 
less valuable situation. Because the task was time limited, any decision to wait for a 
reward decreased the amount of time available to receive future rewards. Human subjects 
self-report that they regret actions taken or not, more than they do missed outcomes 
95,156-
158
. Intriguingly, our decoding results showed strong representations during regret-
inducing situations of the previous zone-entry where the decision was made and the 
action taken p(Zone),but weak and non-significant representations of the missed outcome 
p(Reward).  Most hypotheses suggest that the role of regret is a revaluation of a past 
opportunity that drives future behavioral changes 
23,174
. After making a mistake and 
recognizing that mistake, rats were more likely to take a high-cost option and rush 
through the consumption of that less-valuable option. 
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7. Toward an understanding of OFC function 
7.1 OFC and expected outcomes 
When deciding between options, most animal species have adapted to predict to a 
relative degree the outcome of their chosen actions. In part, this is possible because 
nature obeys a certain set of rules, actions have consequences, and these rules are 
relatively invariant over time
54,76,77,115,244
. Through trial and error animals learn to use 
these rules to make predictions based on previous experiences and in some cases, 
imagined experiences. Over time, animals no longer have to anticipate the state of nature 
and instead can act on stored value.  
In order to represent or abstract new information about expected value a system is 
needed to emulate the possible outcomes and the paths to those 
outcomes
69,73,163,193,252,300,304,305,309,333
. OFC has been strongly implicated in the ability to 
store outcome information and to modify the expected outcome of states in the presence 
of new information, as well as formulate future approximations given the current 
available information
1,91,128,192,193,259,261,263,297,304,308,309,321,327,328,333-335,369
. Previous findings 
can be readily explained by a hypothesis that OFC represents outcome expectations. 
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An intact OFC is necessary for reversal learning in rats, humans, and non-human 
primates
39,53,59,62,85,91,99,122,127,179,180,189,199,274,301,307,344
. OFC associates cues with new and 
different rewards
37,40,215,238,239,281,284,295,301,302,305,307,322
. Reversal learning requires a 
revaluation of learned outcome. Without an intact OFC rats cannot learn the correct 
identity of a reward predicted by a cue after the cue has been reversed
128,192,193
.  
In imagined and hypothetical learning, OFC is necessary for the recognition of 
novel cues that when presented together should result in increased reward
321,333,369
. 
Without correct OFC function, not only do humans fail to show representation of 
hypotheticals and counterfactuals, they cannot report the experience of regret
41,56
. In 
addition, rat OFC represents the counterfactual and the neural correlates in regrets
30,328
. 
Rats without OFC cannot integrate multiple cues and do not show increased summation 
of cues for reward. In the formulation of counterfactuals and regret, humans, non-human 
primates and rats all show representations of the hypothetical outcome in OFC (as shown 
in Chapter 4 and 6)
1,56-58,327,328
.  
These results illustrate an important point; OFC is necessary for updating the 
information regarding the actions and the outcomes in a particular instance. Without 
OFC, previous actions cannot be modified to account for changes in outcome information 
and adaptive mechanisms (such as regret) are no longer experienced, limiting the ability 
of the decision maker to formulate a new expectation of reward. 
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Recent modeling evidence by Wilson et al suggests that the role of OFC is to 
represent outcome expectations in specific states and OFC may contribute to a ‘cognitive 
map of space’369, agreeing with the theory that OFC is primarily involved in outcome 
expectation. In reinforcement learning models, state representations are necessary to 
describe the abstract nature of a task
69,71-73,332,368,369
. In the context of reinforcement 
learning models, OFC would be responsible for formulating the expected outcome of a 
task and may represent the necessary actions to acquire the expected outcome. This 
abstract representation of the expected outcome can include space or any other variable 
that aids in the definition of the current state and outcome identifiers.  
Recent findings are consistent with the representation of expected outcome in 
OFC given the situation, specifically these results support the role of OFC in the 
representation of both past and future outcomes and their specific properties 
1,33,56-
58,315,327,328,333-335
. OFC neurons only respond to a particular variable when that variable is 
instructive and useful in the current situation. Ramus et al showed that 77% of neurons 
were selective to odors when the odors were relevant to reward
251
. However, when odors 
were not useful, only 15% of OFC neurons responded to odors. If a cue was not 
informative for reward, only 25% of the neurons in OFC responded to the cue. However, 
if the cue provided information about reward, 50% of the neurons responded to the 
cue
314
.  
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The similar results in rats, non-human primates and humans indicate that OFC 
serves a similar function in the calculation of expected outcomes, either imagined or 
retrospective. By representing specific decision outcomes and the variables relevant to 
those outcomes, OFC would be necessary for a wide variety of behaviors. Accessing the 
outcome expectation in the current situation would enable a decision maker to 
successfully predict any outcomes associated with the actions in that situation. If OFC 
function were to be compromised, the inability to successfully update outcome 
information in a particular situation could cause perseverance of detrimental behaviors. 
Errors in outcome representations would make it difficult to select the correct emotional 
response for a given situation (the experience of regret) or to interpret context in social 
cues. If one cannot learn to expect a particular outcome for a given action, it is difficult to 
react to an outcome since there are no preconceptions to which to compare the received 
outcome.  
7.2 OFC and reversal learning 
Early evidence suggested that OFC was necessary for preference reversals and 
reversal learning 
19,39,85,120,122,127,189,199,274,338
. In these early experiments, one reward was 
paired with a unique cue and an alternative reward was paired to a separate, unique cue. 
Rats were trained to anticipate the rewards associated with each cue
239,308
. Following 
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learning of the task, OFC was lesioned and cues that predicted the rewards were reversed. 
Rats were unable to learn that the cues and rewards had been reversed. 
How does reversal learning relate to the representation of the counterfactual and 
the experience of regret? If OFC is necessary for reversal learning, then one possible 
explanation is that the OFC is maintaining the relevant information regarding the 
representation of other outcomes. Destruction of the OFC eliminates the ability to 
successfully represent the alternative outcome. Without the ability to represent the 
alternative outcome, it is impossible to experience regret. Human subjects with OFC 
lesions are not capable of experiencing regret (according to measures of self-report and 
skin conductivity measures, where increased skin conductivity responses would indicate 
heightened emotional reactivity, wholly absent in OFC lesioned subjects) when 
confronted with an outcome that is much less desirable than an alternative outcome 
would have been
41,56-58
. This presents an interesting question; are counterfactuals 
necessary to successfully learn reversal tasks especially when outcome information has 
been changed and must be deduced from what was expected, compared to what was 
received?  How closely related are counterfactuals and reversal learning? 
Experimental evidence presented in chapter 4 strongly suggests that OFC is 
heavily involved in the representation of counterfactuals in rats. Upon encountering an 
unrewarded site, OFC neurons represented the alternative outcome, the new outcome 
following the reversal in the rewards. As rats approached a decision point that requires 
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representation of a learned outcome, OFC neurons represented some aspect of reward 
following the decision to proceed to a rewarded location. As the rat approached and 
received a reward, OFC neurons reliably represented the current outcome.  
If a relationship exists between counterfactuals and reversal learning, then one 
would expect that reversal learning may be closely related to disappointment and regret 
through the counterfactual. Reversal learning requires that cues be paired with expected 
outcomes. Under these conditions, if a cue is associated with an outcome, the 
presentation of multiple cues generates an expectation of reward associated with each, 
specific cue
31,39,53,75,122,127,143,189,199,274,301,307,308
. The specificities of the cues and outcomes 
imply that when a rat chooses between the options, there is a specific, expected outcome. 
If that expected outcome is no longer predicted by the cue, the rat will modify its 
behavior to account for the change in the expected outcome. One question that has yet to 
be answered, is that during these reversal tasks when the rats first realizes that the cues 
have switched, does the rat experience regret, disappointment or both?  
Under the framework of regret and disappointment, it may be difficult to 
distinguish if either is being represented in the OFC during reversal learning. 
Disappointment requires that the rat encounters the reversed reward, that only one reward 
was present, that the reward is worse than expected and importantly, that the less than 
expected reward is not a fault of the rat’s choice. However, one key aspect of reversal 
learning is the presence of multiple rewards, which means that the potential for regret 
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could exist. This would indicate that if a rat were to encounter the reversed reward the rat 
may experience regret, namely the representation of the alternative reward, the realization 
that an incorrect choice was made and as a result, the rat has now received less reward 
than expected inducing behavioral change on subsequent trials; the definition of regret. 
On subsequent trials the rat would readily reverse the response to the now correct, 
reversed cue, learning from the previous mistake. The key component that may describe 
reversal learning as a special instance of learning from regret is the inclusion of two or 
more possible, expected outcomes and that the rat’s action resulted in the less desirable of 
the outcomes.  
Perhaps the best way to classify reversal learning is as a ‘specific form of forced 
regret where an agent (such as a rat) unknowingly selects the wrong choice and 
encounters a less than desirable outcome compared to the alternative outcome’. Even in 
the context of uncertainty, human subjects have reported feeling regret about previous 
choices, even when it was not clear that their choices were necessarily incorrect at the 
moment of choice
95,156-158
. 
7.3 Value 
Decision making requires that the value of each potential option be evaluated. 
OFC has been shown to be active during value based decision making. What aspects of 
value does OFC represent? Activity in OFC is correlated to multiple, positive parameters 
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of reward, including gustation, olfaction and general sensory aspects of reward
3,29,191,317
. 
When subjects reached satiation on food or water, the signal in OFC correlating to receipt 
of the goods decreased
217,318
. Signals in OFC are also modulated by the subjective value 
of goods and varied with the perceived value of wine as prices were increased or 
decreased
242
. Individual neurons in non-human primate OFC represent the economic 
value of the available options 
228
. 
Others have postulated that along with the representation of general value, OFC is 
responsible for the representation of rewards in a common currency where the aspects of 
the reward are reduced to a single scalar value that can be compared across multiple 
goods
139,140,223-225,227,229
. These studies suggest that reward is reduced to a scalar quantity. 
Once the attributes or the reward are reduced to a scalar quantity, the common currency 
hypothesis states that all rewards would be compared in this scalar quantity. The common 
currency hypothesis suggests that OFC integrates multiple modalities of information 
including probability size, and time to reward
141,209,228,265,302
 which contribute to the 
possible generation of a common currency signal
50,130,131,165,166
.  
There are several arguments against the coding of value in OFC. The first 
argument is that there are diverse population responses in OFC neurons. OFC neurons 
attend to many features of the situations, including cues 
170,251,298
 and position 
81,89,250,261
. 
If OFC neurons were representing a single scalar value, then different populations of 
neurons would not respond to the different aspects of reward; rather, their neural 
 179 
 
responses should only increase as the perceived value of the good increased. In reversal 
learning, rather than representing value, many neurons fail to reverse their signaling and 
instead new populations activate 
91,296,362
. If OFC neurons were representing value in 
reversal learning, neurons would respond to the cue associated with reward both before 
and after the reversal. Because most OFC neurons do not respond to the new cue/reward 
pair following the reversal, they cannot be representing the value of the new cue/reward 
pair. 
A second argument is that OFC is not necessary for initial learning, only for 
cue/reward pairing changes that occur after the task has already been 
learned
10,36,37,53,91,122,222,238,239
. Rats without an intact OFC may continue to respond a cue 
that predicts a reward devalued with illness; however they will not consume the 
reward
301,307,308
. In addition, OFC in rats and humans is not necessary for choosing 
between large and small rewards and is more sensitive to delays
82,261
. At least in rats, 
OFC lesions have only been shown to slow associative recoding of cues
91,295-297,301
; 
Without an intact OFC, cue/reward recoding is much less flexible while initial cue 
learning is unimpaired
307,308
.  
Other data suggests that OFC is necessary to learn from unexpected outcomes. If 
OFC is lesioned bilaterally, or if OFC and VTA are lesioned contralaterally, rats do not 
learn about unexpected outcomes
334
.  In addition, neural activity in OFC is higher before 
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a smaller known reward than a delayed, unpredictable reward whereas spiking activity in 
VTA is larger after unpredictable reward and smaller after predictable
334
.  
Rather than signaling value, this evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that 
OFC signals outcome expectation in the current situation to VTA; coupling current 
responses with the differentiation of outcomes and impending actions. This suggests that 
OFC is learning outcome representations in the different states
335,369
 and that the state 
representations of the task must be paired with the different outcomes in each state 
93,94,254
. Because OFC encodes all aspects of a task 
81,251,260-262,265,357,358
 , OFC can 
attribute actions to rewards forming the outcome expectation signal
344,365
 . 
When considering the representation of the counterfactual, regret and 
disappointment, an outcome expectation must be present. The counterfactual is the 
representation of the alternate expected outcome. Disappointment is the recognition that 
the current outcome is less than the expected outcome. Most importantly, regret is the 
realization that the received outcome is worse than the expected outcome and that the 
alternative expected outcome would have been better. Without an expectation of an 
alternative outcome the counterfactual cannot exist. 
7.4 Integrating regret theory, value, and OFC function  
What does neural activity in OFC represent and what contribution does OFC 
provide to the process of decision making? The representations in OFC are necessary to 
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combine future rewards (both real and imagined) and to generate expectations as well as 
represent the counterfactual/regret 
1,32,41,56-
58,128,178,212,213,251,284,308,314,321,327,328,331,333,335,345,361,365
. Recent modeling evidence regarding 
OFC supports the hypothesis that OFC is responsible for the representation of the 
expected outcome of the current reward
335
. During initial learning VTA neurons respond 
to unexpected presentation of reward. Following initial stages of learning, VTA neurons 
will respond to the cue paired with the reward. Once learned that a specific cue predicts 
reward, VTA neurons will not modify their responses unless the prediction of the current 
reward is incorrect, neurons decrease their responses to omitted rewards and cues and 
increase their responses to increased rewards. OFC neurons respond to rewards as well; 
however they continue to respond to cues that are predictive of reward as well as the 
reward. Takahashi et al showed that an intact OFC was necessary for the reward 
prediction error response in VTA neurons
335
. 
OFC is more than likely involved in differentiating the different expected 
outcomes and their associated actions, both taken and imagined, rather than the direct 
representation of value. Under this framework, OFC may provide necessary information 
regarding the possible outcomes in the current state, comparing the outcome (including 
the actions that resulted in the outcome) of the expected outcome to the actual outcome.  
In the context of regret, these results likely indicate that OFC acts to simulate the 
counterfactual, comparing what is to what could have been. The representation of each 
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possible outcome relies on a correct and functioning OFC as well as the existence of 
multiple expectations
1,41,42,56-58,327,328
. This process is necessary for the formation of the 
counterfactual. Without an OFC, rats, non-human primates, and humans would not be 
capable of representing the alternative outcome during their selection, consequently 
making it very difficult, if not impossible, to compare the current outcome to the desired 
outcome. The role of OFC in the formation of expectations and the comparison of 
expectations both imagined and real, agrees with the neural representation of the 
counterfactual during regret inducing instances in rats OFC(Chapter 6) as well as the 
neural representation of the counterfactual in non-human primates OFC
1,56,327
.  
The role of the OFC in representing expected outcomes is not limited to the 
outcomes received by the subject. Neural recordings in non-human primates have shown 
that OFC neuronal responses varied not just with the reward received by the non-human 
primate but depended on the amount received by a partnered non-human primate
48,49
. 
Other neuronal recording studies in non-human primates have also shown that OFC 
neurons respond to reward expectation that includes the perceived social context of the 
reward; namely that OFC neurons were including the information about the expected 
outcome (and errors) as the expected outcome was perceived by a non-human primate 
partner
7,371
. In humans, the size of the OFC has been correlated to the increased ability to 
understand social interactions and to increased interpersonal social network size
168
. This 
may indicate that in humans and non-human primates OFC also plays a role in the ability 
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to imagine not just personal counterfactuals, but also the counterfactuals of other’s 
actions, as well as how personal actions and their counterfactuals can affect others  
If an action (either performed by the subject or observed by the subject) is closely 
related to acquiring the desired outcome, then one can expect that the action leading to 
the outcome would be represented in OFC neuronal activity. Indeed this is the case, at 
least in rats, where the representation of the alternative action was much stronger during 
regret inducing situations (Chapter 6). The neural evidence agrees with prior 
psychological reports of regret, that humans express stronger regret for actions they 
should have taken rather than actions they have taken
95,156-158
.  
7.5 Conclusion 
The evidence shown in this thesis represents the first report that rats have distinct 
economic preferences and that rats can experience regret. These regretful instances 
modify their future behavior, much like regret does in humans
96,114,355,375,377-379
. However, 
the economic definition of regret is incomplete and neglects several of the advances in 
learning from temporal difference reinforcement learning; the action and the outcome 
both contribute to the process of the decision 
332,368,369
. Regret as it is conceptualized in 
economics currently ignores the actions that precede the value of the outcome. This 
disagrees with evidence in psychology that states human subjects regret the action that 
leads to the outcome/value more than the actual outcome. By assuming the action has no 
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value and does not contribute to the decision, economic definitions of regret are 
incomplete.  
If we included the action and its related value into the calculation of regret as 
defined by economics, we found that the strongest representation of regret is tied to the 
previously unchosen action. By including the action with the outcome in the decision, 
psychological descriptions of regret agree with economic descriptions of regret (in rats 
and humans). Human subjects report that they regret the action more than the outcome. 
Economic descriptions of regret (regret aversion) show that actions with high regret are 
avoided, implying that the actions when coupled with regret have a negative 
value
23,174,355,375,379
. 
One key differentiation was made, disappointment and regret were distinguishable 
in the neural representations of the counterfactuals. Regret was the comparison of 
multiple outcomes, ‘I wanted that, not this!’, while during disappointment a single 
outcome comparison occurred ‘I wanted this and I didn’t get it’. When representing 
multiple outcomes, the counterfactual must have been calculated. These differences were 
distinguishable in the neural representations of reward and counterfactual information 
(Chapter 6) and agreed with the psychological and economic definitions of regret and 
disappointment.  
Consequently, can rats experience regret? According to the way regret has been 
defined previously in economics
23,174
, I have shown in the thesis that rats can represent 
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the counterfactual during regret inducing situations and that during regret, OFC 
ensembles represent the previously, would-have-been received reward.  
In addition, this research has indicated that previous regretful experiences can 
modify subsequent behavior. These behavioral changes are accompanied by the 
representation of alternative, would have been received, reward information in the 
orbitofrontal cortex. However, there is no direct neural evidence that investigates how 
regret affects the rationality of choices or guides future behavior towards optimal 
economic solutions. Are there differences in the representation of regret? Do humans, rats 
or non-human primates always regret the action that led to the less desirable outcome 
more than the horrible outcome? Are there representational differences in OFC between 
bad decision outcomes and the process of deciding badly, the process of evaluating the 
potential options and acting on those decisions, both of which lead to the experience of 
regret
240,376,377
? 
 If regret plays an important role in decision processes and can explain irrational 
behavior under specific conditions then the evaluation of regret may be able to explain 
why some choices seem irrational. The orbitofrontal cortex is likely necessary for the 
representation of regret as well as for behavioral modifications that rely on the 
representation of regret. The inclusion of regret into the economics and psychology of 
decision making may explain perceived irrational behaviors. 
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This work has shown that humans and non-human primates are not the only 
species that rely on regret to inform future decisions or modify subsequent actions. These 
findings are important because they aid in our understanding how decisions are made and 
how the mechanism works under normal circumstances. We must first understand how 
decisions are made before we can understand how the system fails in case of drug addicts 
or traumatic brain injury.  
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